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DETERRENCE AND IMPLIED LIMITS
ON ARBITRAL POWER
MICHAEL A. SCODRO†
ABSTRACT
Employment, brokerage, and other contracts routinely include
“predispute” arbitration clauses—provisions requiring the parties to
submit any and all future disputes to arbitrators rather than courts. In
recent years, courts have come to enforce these clauses in the vast run
of cases, requiring parties to arbitrate even when the underlying
dispute implicates employment discrimination, antitrust, or other
“public law” rights. In response to this trend, interest has grown in the
extent of courts’ authority to overturn arbitral awards that do not give
effect to such rights. At first blush, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
does not appear to authorize any such review, but federal and many
state courts have come to recognize an additional, judge-made ground
for overturning awards in cases in which arbitrators have “manifestly
disregarded” governing law.
This Article concludes that the “manifest disregard” doctrine as it
stands is legally baseless and should be abandoned. In its place, the
Article urges courts to recognize a distinct but related ground for
overturning arbitral awards—a ground rooted in the arbitration
contract itself. Traditional contract law doctrines encourage courts to
choose contract readings or imply contract terms needed to make an
agreement valid and enforceable. The Article contends that in many
cases predispute arbitration clauses would be invalid absent an
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arbitral duty to apply the law in good faith because, without this duty,
such clauses would interfere with the law’s deterrent function. Society
has a powerful interest in the role many legal rights play in deterring
misconduct, and studies show that deterrence depends critically on a
legal regime’s accuracy. A duty to take the law seriously and make
good faith efforts to apply it correctly should be a bare minimum
required for effective deterrence within any system of adjudication,
and it is this duty that courts therefore must find in agreements to
arbitrate future disputes. Having recognized this duty, the Article
concludes that the FAA itself gives courts the power to review awards
to ensure that arbitrators are living up to it in rendering awards.
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INTRODUCTION
Commercial arbitration has undergone a remarkable
transformation.1 Up until just twenty years ago, U.S. courts generally
refused to enforce “predispute” arbitration clauses—contract
provisions requiring parties to resolve any future disputes in
arbitration rather than in court—when doing so meant ordering
parties to arbitrate antitrust, securities fraud, or other examples of
what are sometimes termed “public law” claims. Courts enforced such
predispute clauses when disputes arose over the meaning of contract
terms. Judges feared that arbitrators might not fully vindicate public
law rights, however, and courts therefore refused on policy grounds to
order binding arbitration when such rights were at stake.2 This was
the state of the law throughout much of the twentieth century,
notwithstanding the 1925 enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA or the Act),3 legislation that on its face requires courts to
enforce predispute arbitration clauses as they would enforce any
other contract, without regard to the substance of the parties’
underlying disputes.4
Judicial concern for the fate of public law claims in arbitration
was not unfounded. In addition to various procedural differences
between judicial and arbitral proceedings, it was often said that
commercial arbitrators were not bound to apply substantive law. At
the same time, the FAA enumerates only very narrow grounds for
disturbing arbitral awards—gross procedural defects such as
5
arbitrator corruption, fraud, or unauthorized conduct. Therefore,
substantive review for decades has been chiefly the province of a
purported judge-made addition to these statutory grounds, applicable
only when an arbitrator has “manifestly disregarded” governing law.6
Courts understandably feared that important, public law rights might
not get their due in arbitration and that the available grounds for
judicial review were inadequate to correct arbitral missteps.

1. This Article uses the term “commercial” arbitration broadly to refer to all arbitration
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act—or its state law counterparts—as opposed to unionmanagement arbitration governed by the Labor Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 185–87 (2000).
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000).
4. Id. § 2.
5. Id. § 10(a).
6. See infra Part II.A–B.
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Beginning in 1985, however, the Supreme Court changed course.
In a series of decisions involving antitrust, securities fraud, RICO,
and employment discrimination claims, the Court enforced
predispute arbitration clauses in the parties’ contracts and ordered
7
plaintiffs’ complaints out of court and into arbitration. As a result of
these decisions, today all manner of statutory, public law claims are
subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to such clauses.
This sea change has not washed away longstanding concerns
about the fate of public law claims in arbitration, however. On the
contrary, arbitration’s procedural informality and concerns over
arbitral competence, bias, or the likelihood of legal error have led
8
some to question it as a method for resolving such disputes. Indeed, a
large and growing group of commentators is willing to accept
arbitration’s recently expanded role only if parties to arbitration can
obtain de novo or similar review of arbitrators’ legal rulings in court.9
For many of these commentators and for at least one federal appeals
court, the “manifest disregard” standard is the ready vehicle for
obtaining the review thought necessary to protect public law rights in
arbitration.10
The “manifest disregard” doctrine is fatally flawed, however, and
provides no legitimate, independent ground for judicial review of
arbitral awards. The phrase originated in dicta in a 1953 decision that
11
the Court has since expressly overruled. Furthermore, the
authorities that the Supreme Court cited in conjunction with its
reference to “manifest disregard” in 1953 are incompatible with the
doctrine’s modern form.12 Because it is the product of passing dicta,
moreover, the doctrine has no fixed definition, leaving courts to apply
it inconsistently.
Most damning, however, is that a freestanding, judge-made
ground for reviewing the substance of arbitral awards would seem to
be an affront to the FAA. The statute includes a list of specific bases
for overturning awards, and with few exceptions courts and
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953) (“In unrestricted submissions, . . . the
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”), overruled by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
12. See infra notes 162–86 and accompanying text.
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commentators do not even attempt to root the “manifest disregard”
13
doctrine in this list. It is almost universally understood as a judicial
addendum to the statute—a dubious prospect in any case but
particularly so for a doctrine arising from passing dicta in an
overturned decision. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that
some courts and commentators reject the “manifest disregard”
doctrine outright and refuse to embrace any form of substantive
judicial review of arbitral awards.14
This Article draws on deterrence theory and traditional
principles of contract law to propose a new basis for limited judicial
review of arbitral awards—one that offers some additional
protections for society’s interest in the enforcement of certain,
mandatory laws. It does so, however, without affronting the FAA’s
limited review scheme. The approach outlined in this Article is true to
the Act’s motivating premise that arbitration clauses should be
subject to traditional contract rules and enforced in the same manner
as other contracts. The standard of review draws its essence from the
predispute arbitration agreement itself, as seen through the lens of
traditional canons of contract law.
The Article proceeds from the principle that many rights, both
statutory and common law, are “nonwaivable” in the following,
limited sense: courts will not enforce contracts purporting to waive a
party’s right to sue to enforce these rights prospectively, before
15
alleged misconduct has occurred. Thus, for example, courts will not
enforce a clause in an employment contract in which an employee
16
vows not to sue for any future acts of employment discrimination.
On top of what may be called a paternalistic concern that parties will
not receive sufficient consideration for rights waived prospectively,
this inalienability is justified on the ground that prospective waivers
will detract from the law’s critical deterrent function. Put simply,
parties who know that they will not be sued for misbehavior are

13. See infra notes 250–53 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. This Article uses the term “nonwaivable” as a shorthand to describe these rights,
recognizing that they can be “waived” insofar as plaintiffs or would-be plaintiffs may be able to
settle suits advancing these rights or contract away their ability to file suit to vindicate them
once the wrongdoing has occurred.
16. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (“[W]e think it clear that
there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”).
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presumed to be more likely to misbehave, especially if they have paid
17
for that luxury.
Nor may parties do indirectly through an arbitration clause what
they may not do directly with an outright, prospective waiver. A
predispute arbitration provision requiring the arbitrator to ignore
employment discrimination or antitrust law, should such a dispute
18
arise, would undoubtedly be unenforceable. But what of the clause
that leaves it to the arbitrator’s discretion whether to apply the law
strictly or to ignore it in favor of the arbitrator’s own sense of equity
on a case-by-case basis? This Article contends that such a clause
should also fail because, like a full-out prospective waiver, it would
detract from the law’s intended deterrent effect.
For this conclusion, the Article relies on studies modeling
deterrence and mapping the variables bearing on a law’s deterrent
power. Numerous models illustrate, specifically, that a perceived
chance of legal error—a departure from the correct adjudicatory
outcome favoring either the plaintiff or the defendant—reduces the
19
law’s capacity to deter misconduct. Adjudication inevitably entails
some risk of legal error, of course. A court may commit a good-faith
mistake, particularly when interpreting nonforum law, addressing a
novel issue, or otherwise applying unfamiliar norms. But there is a
pronounced, qualitative difference between such unavoidable
variability and the uncertainty that would arise if adjudicators lacked
even the basic duty to respect and apply the law to the best of their
ability. In light of its negative impact on the law’s deterrent effect, a
predispute arbitration clause failing to impose this basic duty on an
arbitrator would constitute a prospective waiver of the right to sue,
unenforceable as to the many nonwaivable rights that parties may
seek to vindicate in arbitration.
In fact, arbitration clauses rarely say whether arbitrators must
follow substantive law, but traditional canons of contract law seek to
read contracts in a way that renders them lawful and enforceable.
When nonwaivable rights are at issue, that means understanding the
contract to include an arbitral duty to apply relevant law in good
faith.

17.
18.
19.

See infra notes 204–17 and accompanying text.
See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.1.
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Once predispute arbitration contracts are seen to include an
implicit, mandatory limit on arbitral discretion, it becomes clear that
the FAA itself authorizes a form of judicial review. Among its
enumerated grounds for overturning an arbitration award, the Act
empowers courts to intervene when arbitrators “exceed[] their
powers” under contract.20 Arbitrators who do not work in good faith
to identify and apply the law properly (i.e., as a court would) exceed
their authority under contract. This realization provides a firm,
statutory grounding for a limited right of judicial review.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a short history of
American arbitration law. Part II describes the “manifest disregard of
the law” doctrine—including the attention it has recently enjoyed—
but concludes that the doctrine as it is currently understood is
hopelessly confused and ultimately lacks any legitimate, legal footing.
Finally, in Part III, the Article outlines an alternative—a contractual
duty on the part of arbitrators to apply the law faithfully and a
corresponding ground for judicial review under the FAA’s own,
enumerated bases for overturning awards.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION
Appreciating the modern debate over judicial review of arbitral
awards requires some historical perspective. Congress in the early
twentieth century, and the Supreme Court more recently, ushered in
an era in which arbitrators frequently resolve employment
discrimination, antitrust, securities fraud, and other public law claims
pursuant to predispute arbitration clauses. Not surprisingly, this shift
has increased the call for courts to review the substance of arbitral
awards, particularly when such important public law rights are at
stake.
A. The Enforceability of Predispute Arbitration Clauses
Contracts requiring parties to arbitrate disputes historically met
with disfavor. Courts permitted parties to withdraw their contractual
consent to arbitrate at any point before the arbitrator rendered an
award, at times invoking the mantra that private agreements could
not “oust” the courts of their jurisdiction over legal controversies.21 In

20. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2000).
21. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 73–74.
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the early twentieth century, however, prominent support arose for
laws upholding arbitration agreements—including “predispute”
agreements requiring parties to submit wholly future disputes to
arbitration—first and most notably in the New York State Chamber
22
of Commerce. The state legislature ultimately codified this vision,
enacting the New York Arbitration Act in 1920.23 In relevant part, the
law made predispute arbitration clauses enforceable and enumerated
only very narrow grounds for postaward judicial review of arbitral
awards.24
Shortly thereafter, the New York model suffered a setback, when
the ABA’s Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
drew up the Uniform Arbitration Act, model legislation that reflected
the historical antagonism toward predispute arbitration agreements.
Promulgated in 1924, the Act did not afford courts any authority to
enforce such agreements. It only permitted parties to contract to
arbitrate “any controversy existing between them at the time of the
agreement to submit” the dispute to arbitration.25 A group of states
implemented legislation on the model of the Uniform Arbitration
26
Act. Two others passed laws making predispute clauses enforceable
but requiring or empowering courts to answer legal questions
certified to them by the parties to arbitration or by the arbitrators
themselves.27
In the end, however, the New York model prevailed. In 1925,
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act, which directed courts
to uphold predispute arbitration clauses and provided only narrow
28
grounds for judicial review of the resulting awards. Specifically,

22. IAN
R.
MACNEIL,
AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
LAW:
REFORMATION—
NATIONALIZATION—INTERNATIONALIZATION 25–28 (1992).
23. Id. at 31.
24. Id. at 35–37; see also Frank D. Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155, 161 (1970) (referring to New York’s 1920 arbitration act as a
“revolutionary step” that “enabl[ed] parties in dispute to control future disputes as well as to
settle existing disputes”).
25. Nathan William MacChesney, An Act Concerning Arbitration, to Make Uniform the
Law with Reference Thereto, 50 A.B.A. COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM ST. L. REP. app. A at 590
(1925) (emphasis added).
26. See Michael A. Scodro, Note, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation
for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1941 & n.80 (1996) (Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, and
Wyoming).
27. See id. at 1941–42 & nn.81–82 (describing Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes).
28. The FAA’s legislative history indicates that a prominent proponent of the New York
legislation drafted the Act. See J. Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the
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§ 10(a) of the Act empowers courts to vacate an award only in the
following limited cases:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means;
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
29
made.

The FAA elsewhere authorizes courts to modify an award for
numerical error, inaccurate “description of any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award,” or when “the arbitrators have
awarded upon a matter not submitted to them” or “the award is
imperfect in matter of form.”30 The FAA provides none but these
extremely circumscribed bases for disturbing arbitral awards.
Although the federal statute applies to any “contract evidencing
31
a transaction involving commerce” —a limitation coextensive with
Congress’s Commerce Clause power32—the states have their own
statutory schemes governing arbitration. Here, too, the New York
model ultimately prevailed: the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws withdrew their 1924 act and replaced it with a 1955 version

Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1924) (testimony of Francis B. James, former member of
ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law) (stating that Julius Henry
Cohen, a leading force behind the New York law, bore “the burden . . . of drafting the [federal]
bill”).
29. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
30. Id. § 11.
31. Id. § 2.
32. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995) (“[W]e conclude
that the word ‘involving’ . . . signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the
full.”).

042706 02__SCODRO.DOC

556

5/23/2006 8:43 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:547

33
modeled on the New York and federal legislation. Adopted by most
34
states, the 1955 act upholds predispute arbitration clauses and
provides for only limited, postaward judicial review along the lines of
35
§ 10 of the FAA.
In short, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed what
courts and commentators have characterized as a legislative reversal
36
of the “traditional judicial hostility toward arbitration.” Predispute
agreements to arbitrate became enforceable, and courts retained only
narrow grounds for disturbing arbitral awards.

B. Ongoing Judicial Hostility: “Public Policy” Limits on Arbitrability
Notwithstanding these statutory changes, judicial skepticism
toward arbitration persisted. Agreements to arbitrate future disputes
were now enforceable as a general matter, but courts nonetheless
refused to send particular classes of claims to arbitration pursuant to
predispute clauses. Statutory claims, in particular, were exempt from
arbitration as a matter of a judge-made, public policy doctrine.
The Supreme Court endorsed such limits on the enforcement of
37
predispute arbitration clauses in the 1953 Wilko v. Swan decision.
The plaintiff in Wilko alleged violations of § 12(2) of the Securities
Act arising from his broker’s purported fraud in connection with a
stock sale.38 The broker moved to stay the federal action pending
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the plaintiff’s margin agreement,
which required that “[a]ny controversy arising between [the parties]
under [the agreement would] be determined by arbitration.”39

33. MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 55.
34. The website maintained by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws notes that 49 jurisdictions adopted this version of the act. See http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
35. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (1955). The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved a Revised Uniform Arbitration Act in 2000. The new model,
which twelve states have adopted, is similar to the 1955 act as relevant to this Article. See UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 23 (2000); see also http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (listing 12 states that have adopted revised act) (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
36. Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 256 (1987); see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 219–20 (1985) (noting that the FAA was intended “to overrule the judiciary’s
longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate”).
37. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
38. Id. at 428–29.
39. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 442 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Overruling the court of appeals, the Supreme Court denied the
40
broker’s stay motion and refused to compel arbitration. The Court
grounded its decision in § 14 of the Securities Act, which voids “[a]ny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or
of the rules and regulations of the [SEC].”41 In the majority’s view,
“the right to select the judicial forum”—available for suits under
§ 12(2)—“is the kind of ‘provision’ that cannot be waived
[prospectively] under § 14.”42 The Court reasoned that a securities
buyer who agrees in advance to arbitrate any disputes gives up the
“wide[] choice of courts and venue” that § 12(2) allows “at a time
when he is less able to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities
43
Act places upon his adversary.”
Underlying this conclusion was the belief that the Securities
Act’s “effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as
44
compared to judicial proceedings.” The plaintiff’s securities fraud
claim would require arbitrators to make and apply “subjective
findings on the [defendant’s] purpose and knowledge . . . without
judicial instruction on the law.”45 To make matters worse, the award
would be immune from any serious judicial review:
In [an] unrestricted submission[], such as the present margin
agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation. The
United States Arbitration Act contains no provision for judicial
46
determination of legal issues . . . .

“While the Securities Act does not require [a plaintiff] to sue,” the
Court concluded, “a waiver in advance of a controversy stands upon a
47
different footing.”

40. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77n. (2000).
42. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 435–36.
46. Id. at 436–37 (footnote omitted). Writing for himself and Justice Minton in dissent,
Justice Frankfurter objected that “nothing in the record” suggested that arbitration “would not
afford the plaintiff the rights to which he [was] entitled” under the Securities Act. Id. at 439–40
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 438 (footnote omitted).
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Courts following Wilko applied its “public policy” exception to
exempt other public law claims from arbitration otherwise required
48
by predispute agreement. Among the most recognized decisions in
this line was the Second Circuit’s opinion in a case arising under the
Sherman Antitrust Act—American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co.49 Unlike the Securities Act, there is no language in the
Sherman Act expressly barring parties from waiving the right to sue
prospectively, but the Second Circuit concluded that antitrust law’s
important, public aspects warranted formal, public adjudication.50 The
court reasoned that “[a] claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a
private matter. The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national
interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his
rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney general
who protects the public’s interest.”51 The court was concerned that
“commercial arbitrators are frequently men drawn for their business
expertise” and concluded that it was not “proper for them to
determine these issues of great public interest. In some situations,”
the court reasoned, “Congress has allowed parties to obtain the
advantages of arbitration if they ‘are willing to accept less certainty of
legally correct adjustment’ . . . but we do not think that this is one of
them.”52
The Supreme Court reiterated some of these same concerns in
1974 in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.53 The plaintiff in Alexander
sought to bring a Title VII complaint in federal court after losing a
discrimination claim under the arbitration procedure mandated by his
union’s collective bargaining agreement.54 In concluding that the
adverse arbitral decision did not bar the employee from suing under
Title VII, the Court recognized the important public interest in the
litigation of employment discrimination claims: “[T]he private litigant
not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important

48. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 89–91; see Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory
Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 714–15 (1999) (listing
formerly nonarbitrable subject matter and concluding that “[u]ntil about twenty-five years ago,
arbitration seemed largely confined to contract claims”).
49. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
50. Id. at 826–28.
51. Id. at 826.
52. Id. at 827–28 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953)).
53. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
54. Id. at 39–43.
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congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices.”
Arbitrators are empowered to give effect to the parties’ intent under
the contract, not to advance public policies embodied in federal
statutes, the Court reasoned; accordingly, arbitrators must enforce
the parties’ agreement even at the expense of statutory law.56 “[T]he
resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary
responsibility of courts,” the Court continued, “and judicial
construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII,
whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by
reference to public law concepts.”57 Alexander thus built on the
principle—already elaborated in Wilko and American Safety—that
public courts are the appropriate fora for resolving public law
disputes.
C. A Change of Course for the Supreme Court
The very year that it decided Alexander, the Supreme Court also
laid the theoretical groundwork for a new, more generous view of
arbitration’s proper role in the adjudication of public law claims.
Changes first occurred in the context of international commercial
contracts. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.58 involved an American
company’s purchase of certain German business entities. AlbertoCulver, the American corporation, filed suit in federal court claiming
that Scherk, the seller, had induced the purchases with
misrepresentations actionable under the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act.59 Scherk moved to stay the federal
proceedings pending arbitration before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris, as required by an arbitration clause in the parties’
contract.60 The district court denied Scherk’s motion and the court of
appeals affirmed, relying on Wilko’s holding that purchasers of
securities can proceed in U.S. courts notwithstanding their agreement
to arbitrate future disputes.61

55. Id. at 45.
56. Id. at 53 (“As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator’s task is to effectuate the intent
of the parties. . . . The arbitrator . . . has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict
with the bargain between the parties . . . .”).
57. Id. at 57.
58. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
59. Id. at 509.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 510.
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The Supreme Court reversed. In the Court’s view, the fact that
the contract at issue “was a truly international agreement” meant that
62
the rule announced in Wilko did not apply. Citing the contract’s
international character, the Court reasoned that “in the absence of
the arbitration provision,” there would be “considerable uncertainty”
over “the law applicable to the resolution of disputes arising out of
63
the contract.” The predictability that comes from an arbitration
clause avoids a “legal no-man’s-land” in which parties might engage
in “unseemly and mutually destructive . . . litigation advantages” by
racing to file competing suits in different countries.64 The Scherk
Court concluded that this predictability favored enforcement of the
predispute arbitration clause, notwithstanding the public law nature
65
of the plaintiff’s claim.
Scherk foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s changing views on
arbitration. It did not effect any immediate changes outside the
international context, however. For the time being, courts continued
to adhere to the old “public policy” exception in purely domestic
66
cases.
With a series of four decisions beginning in 1985, however, the
Supreme Court picked up where Scherk left off and eviscerated the
“public policy” exception, making even core, public law rights
susceptible to mandatory arbitration by virtue of predispute
agreements. The first of these decisions was, like Scherk, international

62. Id. at 515.
63. Id. at 516.
64. Id. at 517.
65. Id. at 519–20.
66. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 215 n.1 (1985) (citing cases
applying Wilko to render agreements unenforceable when plaintiffs raised claims under § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act). The Supreme Court, moreover, continued to adhere to
Alexander, allowing employees to sue in court to vindicate federal statutory rights
notwithstanding adverse decisions in arbitration required under collective bargaining
agreements. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981), a Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim, and McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984),
a § 1983 claim alleging violation of First Amendment rights, the Court reiterated that courts, not
labor arbitrators, should have the last word in interpreting federal public law rights. See
Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745 (rejecting the argument that FLSA claims were barred by their
“prior submission” to arbitration on the ground that “Congress intended to give individual
employees the right to bring their minimum-wage claims under the FLSA in court, and because
these congressionally granted FLSA rights are best protected in a judicial rather than in an
arbitral forum”); McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290 (“[A]lthough arbitration is well suited to resolving
contractual disputes . . . it cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in
protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard.”).
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in character. The petitioner in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
67
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. was a Japanese corporation that had
entered into sales and distribution agreements with respondent, a
company headquartered in Puerto Rico that agreed to purchase and
distribute Mitsubishi vehicles.68 The relationship deteriorated, and
Mitsubishi sought a federal court order directing the parties to
arbitrate Mitsubishi’s claims against respondent before the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association, as required under the parties’
contracts.69 Soler filed numerous counterclaims, including a claim
70
under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The question before the Supreme
Court was whether Soler’s antitrust counterclaim should be resolved
in federal court or through arbitration.71
The Supreme Court sided with Mitsubishi and ordered Soler’s
antitrust counterclaim to arbitration. Following Scherk, the majority
held that predispute clauses should be enforceable “where the
international cast of a transaction would otherwise add an element of
uncertainty to dispute resolution.”72 Of particular relevance, the
Court specifically responded to Soler’s claim that Japanese arbitrators
may not apply U.S. antitrust law:
There is no reason to assume at the outset of the dispute that
international arbitration will not provide an adequate mechanism.
To be sure, the international arbitral tribunal owes no prior
allegiance to the legal norms of particular states; hence, it has no
direct obligation to vindicate their statutory dictates. The tribunal,
however, is bound to effectuate the intentions of the parties.
Where the parties have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a
defined set of claims which includes, as in these cases, those arising
from the application of American antitrust law, the tribunal
therefore should be bound to decide that dispute in accord with the
national law giving rise to the claim. Cf. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S., at
433–434. And so long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

473 U.S. 614 (1985).
Id. at 616–17.
Id. at 618–19.
Id. at 619–20.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 636.
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statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
73
function.

The Court continued:
Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts
of the United States will have the opportunity at the awardenforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed . . . . While the
efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at
the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require
intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the
74
antitrust claims and actually decided them.

The Supreme Court thus presumed that Soler could “vindicate” its
rights “effectively” and that U.S. courts could ensure arbitral
“cognizance” of federal antitrust law when asked to enforce the
award.
The Supreme Court brought these same presumptions to bear on
a wholly domestic dispute two years later in Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon.75 The plaintiffs in that case were customers
of the defendant brokers, whom the plaintiffs accused of fraud in
violation of the Securities Exchange Act and federal RICO law.76 The
defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to clauses in the
77
parties’ customer agreements.
The Supreme Court ruled for the defendants. The Court
interpreted its 1953 decision in Wilko to hold not that the Securities
Act’s antiwaiver provision made it unlawful to waive the right to a
judicial forum, but that agreeing to resolve claims in arbitration was
78
tantamount to waiving the Act’s substantive rights. The McMahon
majority concluded that Wilko’s suspicion of arbitration was out of
line with the Court’s more recent, proarbitration pronouncements:
Indeed, most of the reasons given in Wilko have been rejected
subsequently by the Court as a basis for holding claims to be
nonarbitrable. In Mitsubishi, for example, we recognized that
arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 636–37 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 638 (footnote omitted).
482 U.S. 220 (1987).
Id. at 222–23.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 228–29.
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legal complexities of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of
judicial instruction and supervision. Likewise, we have concluded
that the streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any
consequential restriction on substantive rights. Finally, we have
indicated that there is no reason to assume at the outset that
arbitrators will not follow the law; although judicial scrutiny of
arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to
79
ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.

Applying these more contemporary assumptions, the Court held that
plaintiffs had not waived their substantive rights under the Securities
80
Exchange Act by agreeing to submit future disputes to arbitration.
Likewise, the Court found “no basis for concluding that Congress
intended to prevent enforcement of agreements to arbitrate RICO
81
claims.” The Court rejected the respondents’ argument “that the
public interest in the enforcement of RICO precludes its submission
82
to arbitration.” Mitsubishi compelled the arbitration of an antitrust
claim, the Court reasoned, and
there is even more reason to suppose that arbitration will adequately
serve the purposes of RICO than that it will adequately protect
private enforcement of the antitrust laws. The private attorney
general role for the typical RICO plaintiff is simply less plausible
than it is for the typical antitrust plaintiff, and does not support a
finding that there is an irreconcilable conflict between arbitration
83
and enforcement of the RICO statute.

Although the Court’s 1953 holding in Wilko technically survived
McMahon—the former resolved a claim under the Securities Act
whereas the latter involved RICO and the Securities Exchange Act—
the opinion in McMahon discredited Wilko’s reservations about
arbitration as a vehicle for resolving public law disputes. The Court
formally overruled Wilko only two years after McMahon. Plaintiffs in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.84 were
investors who sued their broker for violations of a Securities Act

79. Id. at 232 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628, 633–34, 636–37 & n.19 (1985)).
80. Id. at 234.
81. Id. at 242.
82. Id. at 240.
83. Id. at 241–42.
84. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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85
antifraud provision, the same law that the Wilko plaintiff was
permitted to pursue in court notwithstanding a predispute arbitration
clause. This time, however, the Court concluded that the securities
claim was eligible for arbitration under the customer agreement: “To
the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method
of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of
resolving disputes.”86
Finally, the Court solidified its “endorsement” of arbitration as
an appropriate means to resolve public law disputes with its 1991
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.87 The plaintiff in
that case filed suit in federal court claiming that his former employer
had fired him because of his age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).88 The employer sought
to divert the claim to arbitration pursuant to a clause in the plaintiff’s
original application for registration as a securities representative.89
The Supreme Court ruled in the employer’s favor, rejecting the
plaintiff’s position that enforcing the predispute arbitration clause
would be inconsistent with the “statutory framework and purposes of
90
the ADEA.” The Court reiterated its observation from Mitsubishi
that “‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’”91 The
Court then rejected a series of arguments that arbitration is
inadequate or otherwise inappropriate as a vehicle for resolving
ADEA rights, notwithstanding the fact that the ADEA is meant “not
only to address individual grievances, but also to further important
social policies.”92
Thus, by 1991, the Supreme Court had made clear that, barring
some patent expression of congressional intent proscribing

85. Id. at 478–79.
86. Id. at 481.
87. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
88. Id. at 23–24.
89. Id. at 24.
90. Id. at 27.
91. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
92. Id. at 27; see also id. at 27–35 (outlining Gilmer’s arguments that arbitration is
inappropriate and explaining the reasoning behind the Court’s rejection of these claims).
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arbitration, agreements to arbitrate future disputes were enforceable
even when statutory, public law rights were at stake.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND “MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW”
With the death of the “public policy” exception and with greater
enforceability of predispute arbitration clauses, more and more
attention has focused on courts’ ability to review arbitration awards.
A large and growing number of commentators are advocating de
novo or other forms of substantive judicial review of awards, at least
in cases involving public law claims.93
As noted previously, however, the FAA provides only very
94
limited grounds for modifying or vacating awards. The statute
protects against fraud, overreaching, and other forms of arbitrator
misconduct, but it does not explicitly authorize courts to review the
substance of arbitral decisionmaking.95 It is not surprising, therefore,
that many of those seeking to expand judicial review beyond the
statute’s process-oriented grounds rely on the prevailing, supposedly
judge-made or extrastatutory basis for merits review: the “manifest
disregard of the law” standard.
This Part reviews the origins of the “manifest disregard”
doctrine, the inconsistency in its application, the way it has been
stretched to meet concerns over public law arbitration, and the
ongoing attacks on the doctrine. In light of its history and apparent
incompatibility with the FAA, this Part concludes that as an avowedly
freestanding, extrastatutory doctrine it is an illegitimate basis for
reviewing arbitral awards.

93. See infra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30.
95. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1032 (2002) (observing that “the stated
grounds” for overturning arbitration awards in the FAA do not “explicitly provide[] for a
review of the merits. Rather, the focus of the statutory concerns is improper conduct on the part
of the arbitrators.”).
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A. Origins and Applications of the “Manifest Disregard of the Law”
Doctrine
To varying degrees, courts have recognized a variety of judgemade grounds for reviewing arbitration awards.96 Far and away the
most prominent and well-used vehicle for inquiring into the substance
of an award, however, is the so-called “manifest disregard of the law”
standard.97 The “manifest disregard” locution originated in the

96. See, for example, Julian J. Moore, Note, Arbitral Review (or Lack Thereof): Examining
the Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1572, 1585 (2000)
(citing examples from case law):
In addition to the statutory grounds, there are several common law grounds for
overturning an arbitral decision: Courts have expressed their willingness to overturn
an arbitral decision when it: (1) is in manifest disregard of the law; (2) conflicts with
public policy; (3) is arbitrary and capricious; (4) is completely irrational; or (5) fails to
draw its essence from the parties’ underlying contract.
(footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
97. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, cmt. C.2 (2000) (“‘Manifest disregard of the law’ is
the seminal nonstatutory ground for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards.”); Stephen L.
Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between
Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 465
(1998) (same); Noah Rubins, “Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards
in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363, 366, 368 (2001) (referring to the manifest
disregard standard as “the most widely recognized extra-statutory ground upon which courts
can set aside arbitration awards under U.S. federal law,” and observing that “[i]n the United
States, the ‘manifest disregard of the law’ standard remains the most common way to
supplement the FAA’s narrow procedural protections and give judges a way to avoid enforcing
a particular subset of erroneous awards”); Marcus Mungioli, Comment, The Manifest Disregard
of the Law Standard: A Vehicle for Modernization of the Federal Arbitration Act, 31 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 1079, 1080 (2000) (describing the “manifest disregard” doctrine as “the most recognizable
and universally accepted non-statutory standard of review for an arbitration award”); Michael
P. O’Mullan, Note, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of Securities Arbitration: An Analysis
of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1995) (“Chief
among [the] judicially-created standards is review for the arbitrators’ ‘manifest disregard of the
law.’”); see also Moore, supra note 96, at 1585 (“By far, ‘manifest disregard of the law’ has been
the most hotly contested common law ground for judicial review of arbitral awards.”).
Another well-used basis for attacking arbitration awards is the nonstatutory “public
policy” doctrine. Not to be confused with the “public policy” exception that, until Mitsubishi
and its progeny, kept public law claims out of arbitration, courts still refuse to enforce awards
that themselves violate “public policy” by compelling illegal conduct. This doctrine is rooted in
the longstanding rule that courts will not enforce a contract requiring parties to violate the law
or otherwise act contrary to the public welfare. Some lower courts originally interpreted this
ground broadly, but the Supreme Court has since narrowly circumscribed it. Today, an award
can be vacated for violating “public policy” only if it “run[s] contrary to an explicit, welldefined, and dominant public policy, as ascertained by reference to positive law and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests.” E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000); see also David M. Glanstein, A Hail Mary Pass: Public
Policy Review of Arbitration Awards, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 301 (2001) (“In
Eastern Associated Coal the Supreme Court adhered to the so called narrow approach . . .
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Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko, where the Court observed in
dicta that “interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to
manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial
98
review for error in interpretation.” A majority of the Supreme Court
has only even hinted approval of the doctrine on one occasion since
Wilko was decided in 1953. In a 1995 opinion, the Court observed that
“court[s] will set [an arbitrator’s] decision aside only in very unusual
circumstances,” citing § 10 of the FAA and Wilko, the latter with the
following parenthetical explanation: “[P]arties [are] bound by [an]
arbitrator’s decision not in ‘manifest disregard’ of the law.”99 Beyond
these references—and passing mention in the dissent in Mitsubishi100
and the majority opinion and partial dissent in McMahon101—no
member of the Court has so much as mentioned the “manifest
disregard” standard. Needless to say, the Court has yet to apply the
doctrine, let alone use it to vacate an arbitration award.
Despite its humble origins and lack of explication from the
Supreme Court, the “manifest disregard” doctrine has taken hold in
every federal circuit and in many state courts. Today, parties
dissatisfied with arbitral awards routinely seek judicial review on the
theory that arbitrators “manifestly disregarded the law” in reaching
their decisions,102 although such claims are only rarely successful.103

namely that a reviewing court must find the terms of an award, not the underlying conduct at
issue, violated public policy.”). As such, the “public policy” doctrine provides no grounds for
revisiting the merits of an arbitration award in court.
98. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953) (emphasis added); see supra text
accompanying note 46.
99. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
100. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640, 656
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that arbitration awards can only be reviewed for
manifest disregard and citing the FAA).
101. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231 (1987) (mentioning
“manifest disregard” in the description of the Wilko decision); id. at 242, 257 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
102. A search conducted on December 16, 2005, of all federal and state court cases since
January 1, 2000, in the Lexis database using the terms “manifest disregard” and “arbitration”
produced 703 results.
103. See, e.g., Hardy v. Walsh Manning Secs., LLC, 341 F.3d 126, 129–34 (2d Cir. 2003)
(remanding to arbitral panel for clarification in light of possible manifest disregard of New York
law); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843, 847 (6th Cir. 2003) (“To the
extent that the arbitration award vests any rights in AISUK [a nonparty to the arbitration], or
creates any obligation to AISUK, it is in manifest disregard for the legal principle that an
arbitration panel may not assert jurisdiction over non-parties to the arbitration.”); Gas
Aggregation Servs., Inc. v. Howard Avista Energy, LLC, 319 F.3d 1060, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003)
(upholding vacatur of arbitrators’ award of attorneys fees in manifest disregard of Minnesota
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Nevertheless, there is widespread acknowledgement that the doctrine
has no grounding in the FAA; courts and commentators almost
universally characterize it as a wholly nonstatutory, judicial addition
104
to the narrow grounds for vacatur set out in § 10 of the Act. As one
commentator put it, “[m]uch has been made of the brief excerpt from
Wilko, turning it from an unexplained comment into a widely-cited
105
authority with no support in the statutory scheme.”

law); Halligan v. Piper Jaffrey, Inc. 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that an arbitrator
manifestly disregarded law in ruling against an employee’s ADEA claim); Montes v. Shearson
Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that an arbitrator manifestly
disregard law in rejecting an employee’s FLSA claim); Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc., 12 A.D.3d 65, 71–72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (finding manifest disregard of a “clear,
applicable principle” of New York law and of governing contractual provisions); Sawtelle v.
Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 273–75 (App. Div. 2003) (finding that an arbitrator’s
award of punitive damages was in manifest disregard of New York law); see also Freightliner,
LLC v. Teamsters Local 305, 336 F. Supp.2d 1118, 1127 (D. Or. 2004) (holding, in course of
decision reviewing labor arbitration award, that award manifestly disregarded state statute to
the extent that arbitrator “effectively applied his own notions of what the law should be” and
read statute to invalidate provisions of collective bargaining agreement).
104. See, e.g., Siegel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 739 (Ct. App. 1998)
(“Every federal circuit that has discussed the issue has recognized the manifest disregard of the
law standard for vacating an arbitration award is a judicially created standard; it is not part of
the [FAA].”); MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 33:00, at 2 (2002)
(referring to “manifest disregard” as a “judicially created ground[] for challenging an award”);
Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 88 (1997) (listing the “manifest disregard standard” among
“nonstatutory grounds for vacatur”); Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest Disregard”
of the Law Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL.
117, 118 (1998) (“Seminal among the nonstatutory grounds for vacatur is the ‘manifest
disregard’ of the law standard . . . .”); Bonnie Roach, Recent Development: George Watts & Son
v. Tiffany & Co., 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 503, 504 (2002) (“Manifest disregard is almost
universally thought of as a non-statutory basis for vacating an arbitration award.”); Calvin
William Sharpe, Integrity Review of Statutory Arbitration Awards, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 332
(2003) (listing “manifest disregard” among “non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration
awards” that courts have recognized); Paul Turner, Preemption: The United States Arbitration
Act, the Manifest Disregard of the Law Test for Vacating an Arbitration Award, and State Courts,
26 PEPP. L. REV. 519, 529 (1999) (“[T]he manifest disregard of the law doctrine is not statutorily
based, but is premised on federal common law.”); Marta B. Varela, Arbitration and the Doctrine
of Manifest Disregard, DISP. RESOL. J., June 1994, at 64, 64 (“Those resisting enforcement of an
arbitral award claim manifest disregard is another ground for vacatur in addition to those found
in the United States Arbitration Act and the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments . . . .”); Adam Milam, Comment, A House Built on
Sand: Vacating Arbitration Awards for Manifest Disregard of the Law, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 705,
706 (1998–1999) (“[M]anifest disregard of the law is not one of the four statutory grounds
explicitly set out in the FAA.”).
105. O’Mullan, supra note 97, at 1141; see also Hayford, supra note 104, at 120 (“The oftcited Wilko dictum is the sole basis for the ‘manifest disregard’ of the law standard.”).
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Without statutory or other grounding aside from conclusory dicta
in Wilko, however, defining “manifest disregard” has been a slippery
106
task. “[A] legion of federal and state courts has had to evaluate
what the Supreme Court could have been thinking of when it coined
107
the term ‘manifest disregard.’” “[N]o secure basis exists upon which
courts can apply the standard, thus leading to arbitrary and
108
inconsistent interpretations and applications among the circuits.”
Some prevailing definitional elements have emerged, however.
Perhaps the most well-known and repeated elaboration of the
standard appeared in the Second Circuit’s 1986 opinion in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker109:
“Manifest disregard of the law” by arbitrators is a judicially-created
ground for vacating their arbitration award, which was introduced
by the Supreme Court in Wilko . . . . It is not to be found in the
federal arbitration law. 9 U.S.C. § 10. Although the bounds of this

106. See, e.g., DOMKE, supra note 104, § 34:01, at 2 (noting that, in light of the Supreme
Court’s silence, “state and federal courts have been left in a state of confusion and have tried to
fill the void by building on dictum in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wilko v. Swan[, 346 U.S.
427 (1953)] and Enterprise Wheel & Car[, 363 U.S. 593 (1960)]” (footnotes omitted)); Milam,
supra note 104, at 705 (“The ‘manifest disregard of the law’ standard of review for arbitration
awards has traditionally been a constant source of confusion for attorneys and courts.”); Roach,
supra note 104, at 505 (“[I]t is very unclear from the dicta as to how the courts should apply the
standard.”); Sharpe, supra note 104, at 335 (“[Lower courts] have also entered the breach to
supply content to the [manifest disregard standard] in the face of virtually no guidance from the
Supreme Court.”); Varela, supra note 104, at 64 (“The court did not explain in Wilko, and has
not explained in subsequent decisions, what it meant by [manifest disregard].”); id. at 65 (noting
that “the doctrine is non-statutory in its origins,” claiming that “it is the product of an
ambiguous phrase in a Supreme Court decision,” and concluding that “in consequence, manifest
disregard is a vague and imprecise term”); Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial
Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the “Manifest
Disregard” of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REV. 241, 250 (1993) (“Since Wilko, courts have
struggled to determine what grounds are valid for vacating commercial arbitration awards.”).
107. Varela, supra note 104, at 64.
108. Milam, supra note 104, at 708; see also id. (“Because the basis of manifest disregard of
the law is one that was judicially created in dictum of the United States Supreme Court, the
definition and application given manifest disregard of the law has varied with the circuits.”);
Moore, supra note 96, at 1586 (“The Court has never elucidated the meaning of ‘manifest
disregard of the law’ and, as a result, lower courts continue to debate the validity and scope of
this judicial standard.”); Galbraith, supra note 106, at 250 (“Not only have courts grappled with
whether the ‘manifest disregard’ referred to in Wilko was intended by the Court to be a
judicially created exception to the Federal Arbitration Act, they have also had difficulty
determining what was meant by the phrase ‘manifest disregard’ of the law.”); Mungioli, supra
note 97, at 1080 (“[T]remendous disparity remains in the application of the manifest disregard
standard.”); id. at 1115–16 (“Courts have been confronted with an unnecessarily burdensome
task of searching for a useful definition of manifest disregard, which must end.”).
109. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
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ground have never been defined, it clearly means more than error or
misunderstanding with respect to the law. The error must have been
obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the
average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term
“disregard” implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a
clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no
attention to it. . . . The governing law alleged to have been ignored by
the arbitrators must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.
We are not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel’s award
because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or
110
applicability of laws urged upon it.

This passage includes elements that have become common among
courts interpreting the “manifest disregard” standard. Seeking to give
content to the doctrine using the only evidence available regarding its
intended meaning—the words “manifest” and “disregard”111—most
courts follow Bobker’s lead and limit “manifest disregard” to
instances in which “the law is totally clear, the arbitrator understood
the law, and chose to ignore it.”112
110. Id. at 933–34 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Bret F. Randall, The
History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration
Awards, 1992 BYU L. REV. 759, 766 (“[T]he most often cited formulation of the manifest
disregard standard originated in the Second Circuit.” (citing Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933));
Galbraith, supra note 106, at 251–52 (referring to the Bobker decision as “[t]he most notable
attempt at creating a functional definition of ‘manifest disregard’ of the law,” and reporting that
“[t]he Second Circuit’s explanation of ‘manifest disregard’ of the law in Bobker is often cited by
courts when reviewing commercial arbitration awards to determine whether the arbitrators
acted in ‘manifest disregard’ of the law”).
111. See, e.g., Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th Cir. 1997)
(using the Black’s Law Dictionary and American Heritage Dictionary definitions of “manifest”
and “disregard” to give content to the “manifest disregard” doctrine); Norman S. Poser, Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 510
(1998) (“Used as a noun, ‘disregard’ means the ‘lack of thoughtful attention or due regard’ . . . ,
[whereas] ‘[m]anifest’ means ‘clearly apparent to the sight or understanding; obvious.’”).
112. Sharpe, supra note 104, at 335; see also DOMKE, supra note 104, § 33:00, at 2 (“[T]o
successfully challenge an award based upon manifest disregard of the law, most courts require
proof that: (1) the arbitrator knew of the governing legal precedent yet refused to apply it or
ignored it and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator was well-defined, explicit and clearly
applicable to the case.”); id. § 33:08, at 33 (“Under [the manifest disregard] exception an
arbitration award can be vacated where the arbitrators conspicuously choose to disregard a
clearly applicable legal principle.”). As one commentator observed, courts read “manifest
disregard” to have “an ‘actus reus’-like dimension: the commission of a very serious error of law
by the arbitrator,” and also to “require[] a reviewing court to evaluate the arbitrator’s
knowledge, or awareness, of the relevant law, leading to a ‘mens rea’-like, state-of-mind
determination.” Hayford, supra note 97, at 468; see also Hayford, supra note 104, at 124
(describing the same “two constituent elements” of “manifest disregard” doctrine “as currently
applied by the U.S. Courts of Appeals”).
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To these common elements, courts have added their own
innovations. The Fifth Circuit, for example, requires an additional
113
showing that the erroneous award will cause “significant injustice.”
Other differences are purely methodological in nature. “[T]he Second
Circuit is willing to infer manifest disregard from the record and
underlying facts,” for instance, while “the Eleventh Circuit requires a
114
clear showing from the record.” Indeed, absent any substantive
grounding, such evidentiary requirements take on special importance
as the doctrine’s only real source of content.
B. “Manifest Disregard” as a Vehicle for Substantive Judicial Review
The doctrine’s malleability has led some courts to use it to strike
a “balance” between “‘the public interest in having arbitrators stay
within the applicable law [and] the public policy in favor of speedy
and economical function of the arbitration process.’”115 As one scholar
explained:
The manifest disregard test illustrates two warring forces within the
judicial mind. After centuries of antagonism toward arbitration,
judges have embraced the national policy favoring agreements to
arbitrate, if not a policy promoting arbitration itself. In the hope of
fostering a just yet efficient system, this policy substantially removes
arbitration from the oversight of the judiciary. Yet judges are torn.
By training and temperament, they seem unable to relinquish some
role in reviewing arbitration awards for error. Ambiguous Supreme
Court dictum provided the unlikely basis for an ambivalent judiciary
116
to fashion a limited, if not illusory, standard of review.

In the words of another commentator, “[t]he judicially created
‘manifest disregard’ ground for vacatur represents an attempt by the
federal courts to resolve the inherent contradiction between the goal
that arbitrators faithfully and accurately apply the law and the
absence of meaningful judicial review to enforce this goal.”117 Viewed
through this lens, modern doctrinal inconsistencies “reflect[] each
circuit’s struggle to establish an application of the standard that grants

113. See Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting and
adopting the test described in IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.7.2.6,
at 95 (1994)).
114. Milam, supra note 104, at 708.
115. Poser, supra note 111, at 505 (quoting Varela, supra note 104, at 71).
116. Davis, supra note 104, at 89.
117. Poser, supra note 111, at 504–05.
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proper deference to the arbitrator’s decision while vindicating
118
statutory rights.” In short, the “manifest disregard” standard “has
become a repository for all sorts of outlandish theories of arbitral
misconduct, devised with but one aim in mind: the application of
standards of appellate review to the arbitration process, and
ultimately, to vacatur of a particular arbitral award.”119
Commentators have advanced a variety of policy-based
proposals to shape the flexible, “manifest disregard” doctrine.120 In
fact, judicial and scholarly interest in the review of arbitral awards
generally has grown as laws such as those in the antitrust, securities
fraud, and employment contexts have become the subject of
predispute arbitration clauses. Many commentators now argue that,
as a matter of policy, arbitrators’ legal conclusions should be subject
to de novo or other substantive review.121 For these scholars, the
informality of arbitral procedures, arbitrators’ lack of legal expertise,
and even supposed arbitral bias raise the specter of awards depriving

118. Mungioli, supra note 97, at 1103.
119. Varela, supra note 104, at 65; see also C. Evan Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appeal:
An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79 KY. L.J. 347, 352–54 (1991) (describing the “manifest disregard”
standard as under pressure to expand).
120. For example, Professor Macneil’s treatise recommends a “manifest disregard” standard
that allows for the vacation of awards derived from any obvious legal error, provided the error
“result[s] in significant injustice.” MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 113, § 40.7.2.6, at 95; see supra
text accompanying note 113.
121. See, e.g., Robert N. Covington, Employment Arbitration after Gilmer: Have Labor
Courts Come to the United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345, 387 (1998) (“Critics of
[the Supreme Court’s decision in] Gilmer sometimes suggest that the harm done by that
decision can be undone in part by providing for de novo review of arbitrators’ decisions.”);
Laurie Leader & Melissa Burger, Let’s Get a Vision: Drafting Effective Arbitration Agreements
in Employment and Effecting Other Safeguards to Insure Equal Access to Justice, 8 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 87, 117–21 (2004) (reviewing a range of scholarly recommendations for judicial
review of arbitral awards and recommending the authors’ own variation on the “manifest
disregard” doctrine); Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice but by How Much? Questions Gilmer
Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 631 (2001) (arguing that “courts should
police arbitration awards for errors of law” because “[f]ailure to do so can lead to the use of
mandatory arbitration systems as vehicles for contracting out of statutory obligations”); Poser,
supra note 111, at 518 (seeking a standard allowing courts to upset awards that “show[] an
extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles or an egregious departure from
established law”); Sharpe, supra note 104, at 346 (recommending “integrity” review allowing
courts to reexamine “the arbitrator’s reasoning process to determine whether the arbitrator’s
reasons plausibly lead to the decision”—an appraisal of the arbitrator’s conclusions of law and
fact); Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the
Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 732 (2004) (“Where statutory rights are
involved, the [FAA] needs to be amended to provide for a standard of review of the arbitrator’s
decision that is equivalent to the standard a trial court would receive.”).
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122
claimants of their proper, statutory remedies. Other commentators
contend that predispute arbitration clauses in employment
agreements or other contracts of adhesion are inherently unfair
because they require parties to relinquish their right to a public,
judicial proceeding under coercion and at a time when they are
unlikely to appreciate the effect of their actions.123 Still others make
the point that legally erroneous arbitration awards effectively permit
parties to modify “mandatory” laws, such as the securities and
antitrust laws, which parties are not permitted to alter by contract.124

122. See, e.g., Malin, supra note 121, at 594 (summarizing scholarly concerns).
123. See, e.g., id. at 596 (reasoning that, when agreeing to a predispute arbitration clause,
“[t]he employee or job applicant is unable to assess the likelihood that she may end up in
litigation with the employer”).
124. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (distinguishing between
“default” rules, which parties can modify by contract, and mandatory or “immutable” rules,
which “parties cannot change by contractual agreement”).
An example of this approach appears in Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues
of Lawlessness: A “Second Look” at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 456 (1999) (“[P]rivate arbitral decisions resolving mandatory law claims, or resolving claims
according to principles that do not subvert those of displaced mandatory law, are far less likely
than public judicial decisions to effectuate the purposes of the mandatory laws.”). As Professor
Stephen Ware writes:
When courts confirm arbitration awards that make errors of law, parties lose the
substantive rights that would have been vindicated by an application of the law. Only
in rare cases does a court vacate an arbitration award because of the arbitrator’s legal
error. Outside these rare cases, an agreement to arbitrate is, in effect, an agreement
to comply with the arbitrator’s decision whether or not the arbitrator applies the law.
Such an agreement, then, contracts out of all the law that would have been applied by
a court but for the agreement. All such law, in effect, consists of default rules because
arbitration agreements are enforced. Arbitration agreements contract out of
substantive law; they privatize law.
Ware, supra note 48, at 726–27 (footnote omitted). For these observers, too, the prescription is
de novo judicial review to correct arbitral error, at least on legal questions. See id. at 727
(arguing that the Supreme Court should either revert to the pre-Mitsubishi status quo and
“reverse its decisions that claims arising under otherwise mandatory rules are arbitrable” or
“require de novo judicial review of arbitrators’ legal rulings on such claims”); McConnaughay,
supra, at 461 (calling for “exacting merits review” of awards resolving claims under mandatory
law). Professor Alan Scott Rau likewise draws the critical distinction between mandatory and
default rules in the context of judicial review. See Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American
Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 449, 527 (2005) (criticizing the fact that
courts applying the “manifest disregard” standard “without exception omit even a glance in the
direction of the quite elementary distinction . . . between legal rules that contracting parties are
free to vary (or, which is the same thing, free to entrust to their agents), and those that they are
not”); see also id. at 530 (“The conceptual spillover—from a concern for the protective effects of
mandatory rules, to the suggestion that arbitrators are bound also to respect default,
background rules—is evident, and has been careless and unreflective.”). Professor Andrew
Guzman also relies on the distinction between mandatory and default rules in his article
advocating a scheme of arbitrator liability. See Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability:
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Some courts and commentators see the “manifest disregard”
doctrine as grounds for broad, substantive review of arbitral awards
by interpreting the doctrine in connection with the Supreme Court’s
apparent presumption in Mitsubishi and McMahon that courts had
some means of ensuring that arbitrators at least “took cognizance” of
or “compl[ied] with the requirements of” relevant law.125 Some have
read this language to authorize substantive review of arbitral awards
under the “manifest disregard” rubric in cases implicating public law
rights.126
An example of this approach is the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Cole v. Burns International Security Services,127 a case involving an
employer’s effort to compel arbitration of a former employee’s Title
128
VII race-discrimination claim. In an opinion by then-Chief Justice
Edwards, the panel majority upheld the employer’s right to refer the
suit to arbitration, but only after first concluding that the employee
could obtain de novo judicial review of an adverse arbitral legal
determination.129 The court recognized that the “manifest disregard”
doctrine “ha[d] not been defined by the [Supreme] Court, and the
circuits ha[d] adopted various formulations,” but concluded that “this
type of review must be defined by reference to the assumptions
130
underlying the Court’s endorsement of arbitration.” In particular:

Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1306 (2000). Professor
Guzman recommends imposing a duty, not in the arbitration agreement between the disputing
parties but in the contract between the parties and the arbitrator, requiring the arbitrators to
apply mandatory law. Arbitrators’ failure to do so would not subject their awards to vacatur,
under this proposal, but disappointed parties could seek contract damages from arbitrators who
ruled against them by ignoring the law. See id. at 1316–17.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 74, 79.
126. See Poser, supra note 111, at 514–15 (reasoning that a broad reading of the “manifest
disregard” standard for statutory claims “follows from several statements of the Supreme Court
asserting that [parties] who bring claims under the antitrust laws, the securities laws, and other
statutes should not be deprived of their statutory rights because they have agreed to arbitrate
their claims” (footnotes omitted)); see also Stewart, supra note 119, at 352–53 (reasoning that
the Supreme Court’s statements “that arbitrators must look to and follow the law” have likely
caused “more courts” to “embrace” the manifest disregard standard “and openly look for ways
in which to review arbitration awards that appear to be clearly contrary to law”); Mungioli,
supra note 97, at 1113 (“Implicitly, the manifest disregard standard binds an arbitrator to the
requirement of applying the substantive law, which accommodates the Supreme Court’s stated
corollary interest.”).
127. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
128. Id. at 1469–70.
129. Id. at 1467–69.
130. Id. at 1486–87.
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Two assumptions have been central to the [Supreme] Court’s
decisions in this area. First, the Court has insisted that, “‘[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’” [Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)] (alteration in original); see also [Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229–30 (1987)]. Second, the
Court has stated repeatedly that, “‘although judicial scrutiny of
arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to
ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute’
at issue.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.4 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at
232). These twin assumptions regarding the arbitration of statutory
claims are valid only if judicial review under the “manifest disregard
of the law” standard is sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators
131
have properly interpreted and applied statutory law.

The Cole court thus expressly molded reality to conform to the
Supreme Court’s assumptions about judicial review of arbitral
awards.
C. Rejecting a Freestanding Right to Judicial Review
Although some courts and commentators seek expansive judicial
review of arbitration awards under the “manifest disregard” rubric,
others see no role for the doctrine. Some commentators have
advocated its abolition.132 As one scholar commented, “[t]he manifest
disregard standard, with its dubious origins, conflicts with the policy
that the arbitrators’ decision is final so long as the parties received a

131. Id.; see also Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1459 (11th Cir.
1997) (citing language from Gilmer for the proposition that “[w]hen a claim arises under specific
laws, . . . the arbitrators are bound to follow those laws in the absence of a valid and legal
agreement not to do so”).
132. See, e.g., R. Glenn Bauer, Upsetting a Charter Party Arbitration Award: Are the Courts
Lowering the Bar on Judicial Review?, 25 TUL. MAR. L.J. 419, 439 (2001) (calling for the
elimination of the freestanding “manifest disregard” doctrine, at least as to maritime and other
commercial cases); Varela, supra note 104, at 66 (arguing that the doctrine “ought not to be
interpreted to create a new basis for vacatur”); Galbraith, supra note 106, at 263–65 (advocating
the elimination of “manifest disregard” as a separate, nonstatutory basis for review); O’Mullan,
supra note 97, at 1155 (“[T]he manifest disregard standard should be rejected.”); see also Davis,
supra note 104, at 98 (“Wrung out of ambiguous Supreme Court dictum, the manifest disregard
standard has incited a rash of disapproval.”)
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133
fair hearing.” Relatedly, Judge Paul Turner of the California Court
of Appeal authored an article arguing that state courts are free to
ignore the “manifest disregard” doctrine as federal common law that
134
does not preempt state law forbidding such review. In a decision to
the same effect, Judge Turner reasoned that even a California court
applying the FAA need not provide any merits review—not even for
“manifest disregard of the law”—because that standard lacks any
grounding in the FAA.135 A Tennessee appellate court has likewise
refused to apply the “manifest disregard” doctrine in a case otherwise
136
governed by the federal act, and some state courts have refused to
recognize the doctrine under their own state arbitration statutes.137

133. Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage Firms
Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 434 (2003); see id. at 444 (arguing that
“‘manifest disregard’ should be eliminated as a basis for vacating arbitration awards”).
134. Turner, supra note 104, at 542.
135. Siegel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 739–40 (Ct. App. 1998).
136. Warbington Constr., Inc. v. Franklin Landmark, L.L.C., 66 S.W.3d 853, 858–59 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2001).
137. See, e.g., Coors Brewing Co. v. Cabo, 114 P.3d 60, 63 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (“We
decline to adopt an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law as a ground for vacating an
arbitration award under [Colorado’s arbitration statute or common law].”), cert. denied, 2005
WL 1273570 (Colo. 2005); Police Officers Fed. v. City of Minn., No. C4-99-2041, 2000 WL
719860, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 2000) (explaining in dicta that “Minnesota has not
adopted manifest disregard of the law as a test for reviewing arbitration awards”); MaxwellGabel Contracting Co. v. City of Milan, 147 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Mo. App. 2004) (“‘Manifest
disregard for the law’ is not a basis under [Missouri’s arbitration statute] for a reviewing court to
reverse the trial court’s judgment affirming an arbitration award. . . . The concept of ‘manifest
disregard of the law’ is a judicially created basis for vacating an arbitration award made under
the FAA.”); Action Box Co. v. Panel Prints, Inc., 130 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Tex. App. 2004)
(refusing to recognize the “manifest disregard” doctrine in a case governed by Texas law,
observing that “the manifest disregard standard is a federal common law doctrine, the
underlying rationale for which the United States Supreme Court has largely rejected”); Signal
Corp. v. Keane Fed. Sys., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 253, 257 (Va. 2003) (“Even though courts in other
jurisdictions have vacated arbitration awards when there has been a ‘manifest disregard of the
law,’ we refuse to adopt that standard in this case because to do so would require that this Court
add words to [the Virginia arbitration statute] . . . .”); see also Double Diamond Constr. v.
Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass’n, 680 N.W.2d 658, 660 n.1 (S.D. 2004) (noting that so far “South
Dakota has not adopted the theory of a ‘manifest disregard of the law’ as a ground for vacation
of an arbitration award”). Likewise, the Georgia Supreme Court recently rejected the “manifest
disregard” doctrine. See Martha Neil, In Georgia, Arbitrators May Disregard the Law, ABA J.
E-REPORT, July 26, 2002, at 5 (discussing Progressive Data Sys., Inc. v. Jefferson Randolph
Corp., 275 Ga. 420, 568 S.E.2d 474 (2002), and noting that “[e]ven manifest disregard of the law
isn’t reason to reverse an arbitration decision in Georgia, the state’s highest court has decided”).
The state legislature resurrected it with an amendment to the state’s arbitration statute. Brent S.
Gilfedder, Note, “A Manifest Disregard of Arbitration?” An Analysis of Recent Georgia
Legislation Adding “Manifest Disregard of the Law” to the Georgia Arbitration Code as a
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Even among the federal courts of appeals, one circuit—although
purporting to give effect to the “manifest disregard” standard—
effectively defined it out of existence by taking an extremely narrow
view of judicial review of arbitral awards. In George Watts & Son, Inc.
138
v. Tiffany & Co., the plaintiff sued for alleged breach of contract
and violation of Wisconsin’s Fair Dealership Law.139 The parties
ultimately agreed, after the suit was filed, that they would submit the
140
matter to arbitration. The arbitrator granted the plaintiff some
relief but did not award attorneys’ fees or costs, as Wisconsin law
supposedly required, and the plaintiff challenged this aspect of the
award in federal court on the theory that the arbitrator had
disregarded controlling Wisconsin law.141 The Seventh Circuit asked:
“What could it mean to say that an arbitrator manifestly disregarded
the law?”142 The panel majority found “conflicting lines of precedent”
among the court’s own decisions and observed that “[t]he law in other
circuits is similarly confused, doubtless because the Supreme Court
has been opaque. The dictum in Wilko and First Options [of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan] was unexplained and unilluminated by any concrete
application.”143
Without statutory grounding or Supreme Court guidance, the
George Watts majority used policy to arrive at a definition. “Manifest
disregard” could not mean mere “legal error,” the court reasoned,
because “then arbitration [could not] be final. Every arbitration could
be followed by a suit, seeking review of legal errors, serving the same
144
function as an appeal within a unitary judicial system.” Nor could
“manifest disregard” mean “‘clear’ error.” Here again, the court
concluded, “arbitration [would] not be final, and the postarbitration
litigation would be even more complex than a search for simple
error.”145
The court ultimately settled on a definition “that preserve[d] the
established relation between court and arbitrator and resolve[d] the
Statutory Ground for Vacatur, 39 GA. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (2004) (describing H.R. 91, 147th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003)).
138. 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
139. Id. at 578.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 579.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 580.
144. Id. at 579.
145. Id.
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tension in the competing lines of cases. It [was] this: an arbitrator may
146
not direct the parties to violate the law.” As Judge Williams
recognized in her concurrence, however, this definition conflate[d]
the “manifest disregard” doctrine with the “public policy exception”
to the enforcement of arbitral awards.147 Courts do not need the
“manifest disregard” standard to block awards that mandate illegal
behavior; courts will refuse to enforce such awards by operation of
basic contract law.148 The George Watts decision thus narrowed the
scope of judicial review in the Seventh Circuit by effectively
abolishing the “manifest disregard” doctrine as an independent
ground for vacating an arbitral award.149
Historical notions of arbitral discretion are consistent with a
refusal to vacate awards even where arbitrators intentionally
disregard the law. Traditional doctrine provides that arbitrators are
not bound to apply any particular substantive law unless the parties
150
expressly contract to limit the arbitrator in this way. As one leading
arbitration scholar summarizes: “The general rule . . . is that
arbitrators need not follow otherwise applicable law when deciding
issues before them unless they are commanded to do so by the terms
of the arbitration agreement.”151 Indeed, the same point is often made
152
about (at least the practical realities of) modern arbitration.

146. Id at 580. The court elsewhere indicated that it would also be a “manifest disregard” of
the law to render an award “that does not adhere to the legal principles specified by contract,
and hence unenforceable under § 10(a)(4).” Id. at 581. This Article ultimately works from a
related principle. Importantly, however, it does so without requiring parties to specify any legal
rules in their agreement.
147. Id. at 582. Indeed, the majority expressly drew support for its standard from the
Supreme Court’s decision in E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531
U.S. 57 (2000), a case about the “public policy” exception, not “manifest disregard of the law.”
Id. at 580; see also supra note 97.
148. See supra note 97.
149. See Roach, supra note 104, at 512 (“[T]he Watts case represents . . . the rejection of the
manifest disregard doctrine . . . .”); see also DOMKE, supra note 104, § 33:08, at 35 (“It is an open
question whether other courts will follow the Seventh Circuit’s new and very restrictive
approach to the manifest disregard rule.”).
150. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 331, 345 (“[T]he arbitrator has been under no duty to resolve a dispute in compliance
with the parties’ legal rights.”).
151. DOMKE, supra note 104, § 25.01, at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
152. See, e.g., Kristen M. Blankley, Class Actions Behind Closed Doors? How Consumer
Claims Can (and Should) Be Resolved by Class-Action Arbitration, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 451, 467 (2005) (“Arbitrators are not required to follow the law when making their
decisions.”); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 85
(1992) (“[The] freedom from substantive rules creates a milieu in which arbitrators can ignore
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Some arbitral codes and training materials also reflect this
expansive view of arbitrator discretion. Neither the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) nor the New York Stock
Exchange arbitration codes inform arbitrators that they must apply
153
governing law. Arbitrators are warned not to manifestly disregard
the law, but they are also instructed that they “‘are not strictly bound
154
by legal precedent or statutory law.’” Whenever “‘the law is not
clear,’” or even if an arbitrator “‘cannot determine whether it applies
to the facts of [the] case,’” NASD arbitrators are directed to “‘look to
equity, fairness and justice’” rather than try to divine what the statute
or other law requires.155 This is not to say that most commercial
the law when making decisions.”); Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability
in the Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L. REV. 255, 302 n.277 (1998) (“Arbitrators do not have to
follow the law unless the arbitration agreement directs them to do so. Generally, they may
enforce their own sense of justice.”); Davis, supra note 104, at 76 (explaining that, “[u]nless the
agreement directs arbitrators to apply particular law, the arbitrators may resolve the dispute as
they deem appropriate, regardless of prevailing legal norms,” but also that “[b]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, the parties direct the arbitrators to apply the statute in question”);
see also Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration in the United States, in YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL & ECONOMIC LAW 1997, 251, 261 (Joseph J. Norton ed., 1999)
(“Arbitrators, not being bound by precise legal standards in their decisions, may render awards
premised on the standards of applicable self-regulatory organi[z]ations’ (SROs) standards,
industry custom, or even concepts of equity and fairness.” (footnotes omitted)); Lionel G. Hest,
The Tension Between the Policy Favoring Arbitration and the Adequacy of Arbitration as a
Means of Vindicating Statutory Rights, 1264 PLI/Corp 669, 673 (2001) (“Under New York law,
arbitrators need not follow the law.”). But see William W. Park, The Specificity of International
Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1290 n.217 (2003)
(“The assertion that arbitrators are allowed to be lawless is at odds with the existence of
‘manifest disregard of the law’ as a standard for judicial review, and inconsistent with the
provisions of many arbitration rules.”).
153. Hest, supra note 152, at 672.
154. Id. (quoting the NASD Arbitrator Training Manual). Similarly, see SECURITIES
INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR’S MANUAL 31 (May 2005),
which provides that:
Arbitrators are not strictly bound by case precedent or statutory law. Rather, they are
guided in their analysis by the underlying policies of the law and are given wide
latitude in their interpretation of legal concepts. On the other hand, if an arbitrator
manifestly disregards the law, an award may be vacated.
The Arbitrator’s Manual begins with the following quote from Domke: “‘Equity is justice in that
it goes beyond the written law. And it is equitable to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the
arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law, and the reason why
arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail.’” Id. at 2. See also Rau, supra note
124, at 515 n.272 (quoting the same passage from the NASD manual).
155. Hest, supra note 152, at 672 (quoting the NASD Arbitrator Training Manual). In
contrast, some arbitration codes require arbitrators to apply the law. See, e.g., NAT’L
ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE Rule 20(d) (2005), available at http://www.arbforum.com/programs/code_new/2005_Code.doc (“An arbitrator shall follow the applicable
substantive law . . . .”). Influential protocols designed to govern particular classes of arbitration
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arbitrators do not diligently seek to apply the law in resolving
156
disputes. The question, rather, is whether they are bound to do so
and, if so, on what basis. And although studies suggest that most
commercial arbitrators believe that they should decide their cases
under settled principles of law, many also believe that they have the
legal freedom to ignore substantive law if justice demands.157

likewise direct arbitrators to apply substantive law. See, e.g., DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR
MEDIATION & ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP § C(5) (1995) (“The arbitrator should be bound by applicable agreements,
statutes, regulations and rules of procedure of the designating agency.”); DUE PROCESS
PROTOCOL FOR CONSUMER DISPUTES, Principle 15.2 (1998) (“In making the award, the
arbitrator should apply any identified, pertinent contract terms, statutes and legal precedents.”).
While such protocols “do not have the force of law,” “the major arbitration service providers
have formally or informally endorsed [them], crafted rules to reflect the due process principles
set forth in [them], and agreed to decline to provide arbitration services if the agreement does
not comport with [them].” Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOLUTION 369, 370, 423 (2004).
156. See, e.g., John F.X. Peloso, A Discussion of Whether Arbitrators Have a Duty to Apply
the Law, 949 PLI/CORP. 61, 61 (July–Aug. 1996) (citing former president of American
Arbitration Association and arbitration scholar for proposition that “[s]everal commentators
have stressed the responsibility of arbitrators to follow established legal principles when making
their decisions”); Rau, supra note 124, at 514 (“Now I imagine it is fair to say that arbitrators
usually do try their best to model their awards on what courts would do in similar cases—and
that as often as not they succeed in doing so.”).
157. Ware, supra note 48, at 719–21; see STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 93 (2001) (“Many arbitrators believe they are free to ignore legal rules whenever
they think that more just decisions would be reached by so doing.”); Guzman, supra note 124, at
1306 (“More modern discussions of labor arbitration similarly conclude that arbitrators believe
they should adhere to the collective bargaining agreement rather than the law.”); Soia
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961) (“Eighty per cent of
the experimental arbitrators thought that they ought to reach their decisions within the context
of the principles of substantive rules of law, but almost 90 per cent believed that they were free
to ignore these rules whenever they thought that more just decisions would be reached by so
doing.”). Professor Mentschikoff noted, however, that the results of her survey were “curiously
parallel to the attitudes that seem to be implicit in our appellate courts.” Id. A more recent
survey of American Arbitration Association construction arbitrators found that 72 percent of
respondents indicated that they “always follow[ed] the law in formulating [their awards],”
though fewer than one third of those who explained this response expressly indicated that they
always followed the law because “it was essential or their duty” to do so. Dean B. Thomson,
Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction Arbitrators, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 137, 154–55 (1994). Among the 20 percent of respondents who indicated that they do not
always follow the law, several “stated they did not know the law and therefore could not follow
it,” while an equal number “said they would not follow the law if it led to an inequitable result.”
Id.
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D. The Absence of Legal Grounding for the Modern “Manifest
Disregard” Doctrine
The “manifest disregard” doctrine is thus the focus of widely
diverging views—some observers see it as a vehicle for de novo
judicial review and others as an illegitimate judicial gloss on the FAA.
Of these positions, those who claim that the doctrine is ill-founded as
an “extrastatutory” doctrine would seem to have the better argument.
As described above, the FAA permits courts to vacate or modify
arbitral awards only under certain carefully enumerated
circumstances.158 “Notably absent from that list is any mention of
manifest disregard of the law, or, for that matter, any substantive
review. According to the common law maxim of contract and
statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius, such a list
should be read as exclusive.”159 In short, the Act would seem to
foreclose additional, wholly judge-made grounds for overturning
arbitral awards.
Commentators have correctly remarked that dicta in Wilko is
160
shaky ground for a freestanding, nonstatutory doctrine in any event.
This is all the more obviously true when one recalls that Wilko is no
longer good law; the Supreme Court overturned that case’s “public
policy” rule in Rodriguez de Quijas.161 Conclusory dicta in an
overturned decision is exceptionally weak footing for any doctrine, let
alone one that flies in the face of Congress’s effort to circumscribe the
grounds for judicial review.
Nor are the historical sources on which the Wilko Court relied of
any help. In fact, although these sources have received relatively little
scholarly attention in this context, they are of tremendous interest
because many actually conflict with the “manifest disregard” standard
in use today. The Wilko Court cited a string of authorities in
connection with its “manifest disregard” language, but several of
these sources justified judicial review as a way to give effect to the

158. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30.
159. O’Mullan, supra note 97, at 1138 (footnotes omitted).
160. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 97, at 471. As Professor Hayford writes:
This nonstatutory ground for vacatur was created ‘ex nihilo’ in what may well have
been only a passing, insignificant reference in dictum. The oblique nature of the
Supreme Court’s reference to the ‘manifest disregard of the law’ ground in Wilko and
the subsequent lack of guidance from the Court as to the proper meaning and effect
of this criterion for vacatur indicate how slender a reed the standard rests upon.
Id.
161.

See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.

042706 02__SCODRO.DOC

582

5/23/2006 8:43 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:547

arbitrator’s intent, not to override the arbitrator’s will as the modern
162
These sources
“manifest disregard” doctrine purports to do.
reflected the idea that a mistake of law visible on the face of an award
suggested that the award did not represent the arbitrator’s intended
resolution of the dispute. The courts were prepared to correct the
mistake—and modify the award accordingly—to give effect to the
arbitrator’s presumed intent. Relatedly, there was the notion that
arbitrators who laid their legal reasoning bare in their awards did so
to elicit judicial review; a court would review an award, and correct
legal mistakes therein, to oblige the arbitrator’s tacit request for
judicial aid. Because the Wilko authorities have received relatively
scant attention, I touch briefly on each in turn.
The Wilko majority supported its reference to “manifest
disregard” in part by citing the Supreme Court’s mid-nineteenthcentury decision in Burchell v. Marsh.163 The Court in that case
acknowledged that the bench may “interfere” with an award in cases
of “‘gross mistake,’” but only if the error was “‘made out to the
satisfaction of the arbitrator, and that if it had not happened, he
should have made a different award.’”164 In other words, courts could
only correct inadvertent arbitral error—an effort to give effect to the
arbitrator’s actual intent.
165
The Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Farragut
likewise described courts’ ability to correct arbitral error when an
award “f[ound] or announce[d] concrete propositions of law, unmixed
with facts” and misinterpret[ed] those legal propositions.166 In the
pages on which Wilko relied, the Farragut Court also spoke in terms
of “manifest mistake of law” and arbitral “misapprehension of the
law.”167 Once again, the Court appeared concerned that innocent
error might trip up the arbitrator bent on applying the law correctly.
168
In Kleine v. Catara, an 1814 District of Massachusetts decision
authored by Justice Story, the court expressly distinguished between
arbitrators’ innocent legal mistakes—which courts would correct—

162. See infra notes 163–86 and accompanying text.
163. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1855).
164. Id. at 350 (quoting Lord Thurlow’s opinion in Knox v. Symmonds, (1791) 30 Eng. Rep.
390 (A.C.)).
165. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 406 (1875).
166. Id. at 420.
167. Id. at 420–21 (emphases added).
168. 14 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7,869).
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and knowing departures from legal norms—which courts would not
169
disturb. Justice Story agreed “that if the referees [made a] mistake
in a plain point of law or fact, either apparent upon the award itself,
170
or made out in proof, the court ought to set aside the award.” But
unless the parties’ contract provided otherwise, the arbitrators
“[we]re not bound to award upon the mere dry principles of law
applicable to the case before them. They [could] decide upon
principles of equity and good conscience, and [could] make their
award ex aequo et bono.”171 The ensuing discussion put this
distinction in sharp relief:
If, therefore, under an unqualified submission, the referees meaning
to take upon themselves the whole responsibility, and not to refer it
to the court, to decide differently from what the court would on a
point of law, the award ought not to be set aside. If, however, the
referees mean to decide according to law, and mistake, and refer it
to the court to review their decision, (as in all cases, where they
specially state the principles, on which they have acted, they are
presumed to do,) in such cases, the court will set aside the award, for
it is not the award, which the referees meant to make, and they
acted under a mistake. On the other hand, if knowing what the law
is, they mean not to be bound by it, but to decide, what in equity and
good conscience ought to be done between the parties, their award
ought to be supported, although the whole proceedings should be
172
apparent on the face of the award.

Justice Story made plain that courts would intervene only to advance
the arbitrator’s intent, not to conform an award to the law when an
arbitrator consciously chose to ignore it.
The final three opinions cited by the Wilko majority added little
as to when courts would disturb arbitral awards. The Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern
Railway Co.173 merely noted that the court would not revisit a
question of interpretation under the Mandatory Freight Accounting
174
Rules submitted to arbitration pursuant to those rules. The Second
Circuit in North of England S.S. Co. v. Munson S.S. Line (In re The

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 734–35.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
Id.
158 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1946).
Id. at 256–57.
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175
Hartbridge), upheld an award purportedly founded on fundamental
176
error. And although the First Circuit in Mutual Benefit Health &
Accident Ass’n v. United Casualty Co.177 noted that Massachusetts law
required arbitrators to “act[] in good faith” and within the scope of
their “authority,” the court upheld the award over an objection that
the arbitrator had misinterpreted the contract, without any statement
to the effect that a “manifest disregard” of the law would have been
grounds for vacateur.178
The Wilko majority also cited Professor Wesley Sturges’
arbitration treatise in conjunction with the Court’s reference to
179
“manifest disregard.” In relevant part, however, Professor Sturges
recognized the traditional rule that “under an unrestricted submission
arbitrators are not required to decide ‘according to law’”; and
“[w]hile the parties may expressly require the arbitrators to decide
according to law, it is clear that the courts will not readily allow an
award to fall by construing a submission agreement as making such
requirement.”180 Like Justice Story, Professor Sturges distinguished
cases in which arbitrators intended to follow the law but inadvertently
erred:

If, however, it is made to appear that the arbitrators undertook to
decide according to law but missed it, that is, if it is made to appear
that the arbitrators assumed the law to be in a certain way, and that
they would have decided differently if they had known, before they
rendered their award, that their assumption was wrong, they are said
to have made a “mistake of law.” This is sufficient cause to
181
invalidate an award.

Once again, the aim of judicial review was to correct error interfering
with the arbitrator’s intended outcome, not to convert a consciously
nonlegal award into a legal one.
Another source cited by the Wilko majority for its reference to
“manifest disregard” was a 1950 student note published in the

175. 62 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1932).
176. Id. at 73.
177. 142 F.2d 390 (1st Cir. 1944).
178. Id. at 393–94.
179. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953).
180. WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION & AWARDS
500–02 (1930); see also supra text accompanying note 151.
181. Id. at 503.
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182
Harvard Law Review. Far from supporting some form of judicial
review, however, the portion of the note on which the Court relied
reported that “[a]side from [a] few [outlying] cases, the general view,
both at common law and by statute, is that the courts will not review
for its wisdom or soundness the principle selected by the arbitrator,
unless his discretion in making that selection is limited by the terms of
the submission agreement.”183 Moreover, the note acknowledged a
rule in some jurisdictions granting courts authority to overturn legally
erroneous awards only when it was clear that the arbitrator intended
to follow the law.184
Finally, the Wilko majority cited an article by Professor
185
Archibald Cox in the Chicago Bar Record. Although Professor Cox
urged arbitrators to “give effect to settled statutory duties,” he
counseled against any judicial review of arbitral awards.186 He neither
described nor recommended a practice of judicial review aimed at
thwarting arbitrators’ conscious efforts to disregard the law.
*
*
*
In short, the authorities on which the Wilko majority relied for its
“manifest disregard” dicta do not support the doctrine in its current
form—that is, as a check on an arbitrator’s intentional departure from
established law. On the contrary, courts and commentators
contemplated judicial intervention as a means to give effect to the
arbitrator’s intent. Courts following this rationale would vacate an
award when the arbitrator manifested an intention to adhere to the
law but erred in executing this intention,187 not when the arbitrator

182. Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HARV. L. REV. 681
(1950).
183. Id. at 685 (emphasis added). Professor Rau quotes this same passage and likewise
concludes that, although cited by the Wilko majority, the Note “says nothing” whatever about a
“manifest disregard” standard of review. Rau, supra note 124, at 522 n.299.
184. See Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, supra note 182, at 687
(“This power to interfere is justified in the decisions as a means to prevent an award from
achieving an effect which the arbitrator, as can be seen from his own theory, really did not
intend.”).
185. Archibald Cox, The Place of Law in Labor Arbitration, CHI. BAR REC., Oct. 1952, at
205, 208, 210.
186. Id. at 208, 210.
187. For a more recent statement justifying review on these grounds, see Allen v. A & W
Contractors, Inc., 433 So. 2d 839, 842 (La. Ct. App. 1983), holding that a court can set aside an
arbitral award “where, in the case of an error of law, it clearly appears from a statement of the
basis of the award that the arbitrators meant to decide the case according to law” (quoting
5 AM. JUR. 2D Arbitration and Award § 167).
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consciously disregarded legal rules, as the modern “manifest
188
disregard” standard allows. As Professor Rau recently summarized
the doctrine’s mysterious pedigree:
I can’t find even the slightest trace of the paternity of this phrase in
any context remotely related to arbitration; if it ever appeared in the
cases before Wilko, it was as a mere catchphrase trotted out in a
hodgepodge of entirely alien settings—sometimes to suggest a highly
restrictive standard of scrutiny, sometimes as a rhetorical flourish at
the moment of overturning a jury verdict or the judgment of some
189
other inferior tribunal.

The doctrine’s dubious origins, coupled with the FAA’s expressly
circumscribed list of bases for review, make the doctrine especially
weak. Nor is there any sound basis for rooting a power of judicial
review—or for expanding the “manifest disregard” standard—in the
Court’s presumption in Mitsubishi and its progeny that arbitration
awards will receive scrutiny “sufficient to ensure that arbitrators
comply with the requirements of the statute at issue.”190 Like the
“manifest disregard” doctrine, such an approach builds entirely on
conclusory phrases from Supreme Court opinions as grounds for a
new, extrastatutory review mechanism. More importantly, the Court
does not purport to create standards for review in Mitsubishi or
McMahon; the Court claims merely to describe the existing state of
affairs.191 If the standards the Court presumes to exist do not, that may
188. Professor Rau recently characterized the perverse motives put in place by this historical
approach
It must have created some odd incentives indeed: For if the modern arbitrator, in
order to safeguard the currency of his award, will often purport to have followed legal
principles—even when he hasn’t—the common-law arbitrator must have often felt
the need—even while scrupulously straining to apply the law—to appear to disregard
it completely!
Rau, supra note 124, at 511 n.248.
189. Id. at 522. This is not to say that reference was not occasionally made in the pre-Wilko
era to review for what would now be called “manifest disregard.” Along these lines, see Philip
G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590,
604 (1934): “There is some intimation, however, that if the arbitrators know the law, and
deliberately choose to disregard it, their awards may be set aside.” Professor Phillips cites, for
support, Allen v. Smith’s Administrator, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 234 (Del. 1845). I am grateful to
Professor Christopher Drahozal for bringing this reference to my attention.
190. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987); see supra text
accompanying notes 74, 79, & 130–31.
191. Cf. Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Mgmt., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 218, 226–27 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), aff’d, 164 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 1998) (table):
While it is true that the Supreme Court has indicated that rights are not surrendered
when a party agrees to arbitrate and that judicial review, though limited, is sufficient

042706 02__SCODRO.DOC

2005]

5/23/2006 8:43 AM

ARBITRATION

587

be grounds for revisiting the Court’s decision to compel arbitration,
not for creating a new standard commensurate with an erroneous
premise. Once again, moreover, any addition to the FAA’s narrowly
circumscribed grounds for review would seem boldly at odds with
192
congressional intent.
All in all, it is by no means surprising that the “manifest
disregard” doctrine suffers from all of the definitional and legitimacy
problems described in this Part. Nor is it surprising that some of those
seeking to preserve the doctrine hope that Congress will amend the
FAA to provide expressly for a legitimate “manifest disregard”
193
review. As the doctrine is typically characterized, however—as a
judge-made addition to the FAA premised on dicta in Wilko—there
is little to recommend it.
III. A STATUTORY BASIS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
In lieu of the troubled “manifest disregard” doctrine, this Part
develops a related, but distinct, standard grounded firmly in the FAA
and arising from limits on arbitral authority inherent in predispute
arbitration clauses themselves. Admittedly, arbitration clauses rarely
specify expressly whether arbitrators must adhere to the law or
whether they have the discretion to disregard it.194 Nor is there
necessarily any obvious assumption as to whether contracting parties
195
think that arbitrators will faithfully apply applicable substantive law.
to ensure that arbitrators comply with the law . . . there is absolutely nothing in any of
these Supreme Court cases . . . which indicates that the scope of review for statutory
claims is any different from any other arbitrated claims.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95 & 104–05.
193. One of these authors implies, correctly I think, that the standard will remain
amorphous and inconsistently applied until it has some statutory or other legal grounding.
Milam, supra note 104, at 711, 716, 729–32. Under another proposal to amend the FAA, review
for manifest disregard would only be available if the parties agreed to such review in their
contract. Mungioli, supra note 97, at 1116, 1121.
194. Cf. DOMKE, supra note 104, § 25.01, at 2–3 (“Standard arbitration clauses do not
usually contain any reference to . . . the law to be applied . . . .”). Professor Macneil’s treatise
observes that contracts “often do not” include choice of law provisions. MACNEIL, supra note
113, § 40.7.2.4, at 90. In fact:
[Even] when they do, the meaning of the choice of law clause may be obscure. It may
(or may not) refer only to the general body of substantive law the parties expect the
arbitrators to look to, to whatever extent they apply legal principles. It may (or may
not) be intended to require the arbitrators to apply the designated law correctly.
Id.
195. Professor Macneil’s treatise provides that, “since parties quite commonly confer powers
on arbitrators only in general terms, . . . much will turn on assumptions the courts make about
what parties in general do intend to consent to respecting arbitral powers.” MACNEIL, supra
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Here, however, traditional principles of contract interpretation
and construction come into play. Absent evidence to the contrary,
courts assume that parties do intend for their contracts to be
enforceable, and ambiguous language in a contract is read to this end.
Likewise, contractual gaps are filled, when necessary, to allow for the
contract’s enforceability.
Viewed through the lens of these well-worn rules, arbitration
clauses themselves prohibit arbitrators from disregarding
“nonwaivable” statutory and common law rights. Predispute
arbitration clauses should be understood to impose a duty on
arbitrators to identify and apply the law in good faith when such
rights are at issue.196 Without that duty, arbitration would materially
undermine the law’s deterrent effect, and the arbitration clause would
therefore become an unenforceable, prospective waiver of the right to
sue. Arbitrators’ failure to satisfy this duty to apply the law in good
faith would permit courts to overturn the resulting awards on the
ground that the arbitrators exceeded their authority under contract, a
basis for vacating awards under the FAA.

note 113, § 40.7.2.6, at 95. The ubiquity of the idea that arbitrators are not bound to apply
substantive law makes it difficult to presume that the parties to predispute arbitration
agreements expect arbitrators to feel bound by legal rules. See DOMKE, supra note 104, § 25.01,
at 3 (“It is often said that the parties do not expect the arbitrators to make their decision
according to rules but rather, especially when the arbitrators are not lawyers, on the basis of
their experience, knowledge of the customs of the trade, and fair and good sense for equitable
relief.”); David A. Lipton, The Standard on Which Arbitrators Base Their Decisions: The SROs
Must Decide, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 18 (1988) (“Parties to arbitration do select that forum of
dispute resolution precisely because of the opportunity to have a dispute resolved in accordance
with equitable judgment rather than by strict adherence to the law.”); Ware, supra note 48, at
720 (“The widespread belief among arbitrators that they are under no duty to apply the law is
consistent with standard expectations about arbitration . . . .”). But see Rau, supra note 124, at
515 (reasoning that arbitrators’ presumed efforts to follow the law are “most likely . . .
congruent with the ex ante expectations of contracting parties, who—behind the proverbial veil
of ignorance—may not have supposed that in drafting an arbitration clause, they were entirely
surrendering the right to have their conduct judged by external legal standards”).
196. The following discussion is necessarily specific to arbitration involving “nonwaivable”
rights, as that term is defined in this Article. See supra note 15. The theory outlined in this
Article would not apply to arbitration implicating only laws whose protections can be waived
prospectively. For an argument favoring arbitral discretion to reject or modify such “default”
rules, see Ware, supra note 48, at 744–50.
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A. The Deterrent Function of Rights that Cannot Be Waived
Prospectively
Certain rights cannot be traded away, at least prospectively, by
the parties who enjoy their protections.197 Often called “exculpatory”
clauses, contract provisions waiving a party’s right to sue are
198
therefore frequently unenforceable. Congress and the courts have
made plain that parties cannot contract away the right to sue to
vindicate any of an array of statutory rights.199 Recall that the Wilko
Court relied on language in the Securities Act forbidding parties to
200
waive their rights prospectively; the Court in Mitsubishi likewise
made clear that parties cannot waive their right to sue under the
201
antitrust laws. Many common law actions, including suits for
intentional, reckless, and even grossly negligent torts, also cannot be

197. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111–15 (1972) (describing
“inalienable entitlements”).
198. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 110–13.
199. For example, the Securities Exchange Act provides that “[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.” 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2000); see also id. § 77n (providing for a similar rule under the Securities Act);
id. § 80b-15(a) (providing for a similar rule under the Investment Advisers Act). ERISA
likewise provides that, with certain exceptions, “any provision in an agreement or instrument
which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility,
obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.”
29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (2000). Many times, the courts have held that statutory rights are not
waivable prospectively, even absent statutory language to that effect. Thus, for example, the
Supreme Court has declared “that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights
under Title VII.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1973); see also Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (stating that FLSA “rights cannot be
abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of the statute
and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate” (quoting Brooklyn Savs. Bank
v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945))); 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 19:26, at 316 (1998) (“A purported exemption from statutory liability is usually
void, unless the purpose of the statute is merely to give an added remedy which is not based on
any strong policy.” (footnote omitted)).
200. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (holding that the language of the judicial
forum selection provision of the Securities Act prohibits waivers); supra text accompanying note
41.
201. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19
(1985) (“[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we
would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”).
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202
waived prospectively. Often, courts allow actions for even common
negligence to proceed notwithstanding a predispute waiver.203
Courts and scholars offer two primary reasons for voiding
204
prospective litigation waivers—deterrence and compensation.
These are obviously related goals; a civil sanction deters by requiring
violators to compensate their victims. Ultimately, however,
deterrence is often identified as the more important public benefit,
and it is that benefit—and the limit it places on parties’ capacity to
waive rights prospectively—that is the focus of this Article. Indeed,
“[a]t the heart of most command statutes is a deterrence goal.
Congress wishes to stop particular conduct either because the conduct
itself directly causes harm, or because secondary consequences of the
conduct cause harm.”205

202. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 112 (“Courts generally hold contract clauses to be void
as against public policy if their effect is to exempt a party from liability for its own future fraud
or intentional torts, violations of statute, and injuries caused by gross negligence or
recklessness.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. (“General principles of common law likewise
have broadly disfavored prospective waivers of extra-contractual rights, whether those be rights
grounded in the law of tort or in statutes.”); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.2, at 328
(3d ed. 1999) (“A party clearly cannot exempt itself from liability in tort for harm that it causes
intentionally or recklessly.”); 8 WILLISTON, supra note 199, § 19:23, at 291–97 (“An attempted
exemption from liability for a future intentional tort or crime or for a future willful or grossly
negligent act is generally held void . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Anita Cava & Don Wiesner,
Rationalizing a Decade of Judicial Responses to Exculpatory Clauses, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
611, 613 (1988) (“Courts uphold exculpatory clauses only if simple negligence is at issue.”);
Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth Activities—The Alternative
to “Nerf®” Tiddlywinks, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 727 (1992) (“Even if an exculpatory agreement is
otherwise valid, many courts have held that such agreements will not preclude tort liability for
various forms of more serious tortuous conduct.”).
203. Recent Case, Wagenblast v. Odessa School District, 110 Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 968
(1988), 102 HARV. L. REV. 729, 729–34 (1989) (summarizing state court tests for deciding when
to enforce exculpatory clauses in negligence cases).
204. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 (referring to antitrust law’s “remedial and
deterrent function”); Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private
Rights of Action, 34 VILL. L. REV. 429, 434 (1989) (“Both compensatory and deterrent goals are
present in private rights of action . . . .”).
205. McMorrow, supra note 204, at 456; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 806 (1998) (noting that Title VII aims to compensate but that “its ‘primary objective,’ like
that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress, but to avoid
harm”); Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 278–84 (2002) (contending that the foremost purpose behind
U.S. antitrust law, as interpreted by courts, is deterrence); Steven S. Poindexter, Note, PreDispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Title VII: Promoting Efficiency While Protecting
Employee Rights, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 301, 311 (“The primary purpose of Title VII is to avoid
harm to employees by discrimination, not to redress harm to individual employees.”). More
broadly, “[a] decrease in the deterrent effect of the law is especially problematic in the United
States, where tort duties are a major component of how social policy is enforced.” Elizabeth G.
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The deterrence goal looms particularly large before a dispute
arises. At that point, society’s primary interest in a putative right of
action lies in its ability to deter misconduct: “Remedies have both
deterrent and compensatory effects, but at different times in the
process, deterrence or compensation may predominate. Prior to the
existence of a particular dispute, the potential availability of
compensatory remedies acts purely as a deterrent, telling potential
defendants how to order their conduct.”206 Giving private parties the
right to sue to protect their own substantive rights lessens the
207
government’s burden in enforcing its laws. “[T]he mere possibility
that one can sue if a wrongful act is committed discourages
commission of the act.”208 Settlement after the fact is, of course,
209
permissible —parties are not compelled to raise claims let alone
litigate them to a final and public conclusion—because unlike
“prospective waivers,” settlements do not “affect the public interest
by diminishing deterrence.”210 As another commentator put the point,
“prospective waivers, unlike settlements, can be viewed as
undermining the goals of statutes that regulate market relationships
to reduce the occurrence of activity condemned as intrinsically
bad.”211
The deterrent effect of nonwaivable rights is of the utmost
importance, not solely to the individual who may become the victim
of misconduct, but also to third parties and to society generally. To
take an example, the law strictly limits the class of parties permitted
to advance federal antitrust claims; suits by “downstream” purchasers
and others injured indirectly by anticompetitive behavior are often

Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury
Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 271 (2004).
206. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 118.
207. McMorrow, supra note 204, at 449.
208. Id. at 464; see also id. (“[A] proper tension of inchoate rights to sue discourages
wrongful acts.”).
209. Id. at 459–61, 463–65.
210. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 118; see also Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives,
Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1296 (1993) (“[T]he prospective sale of a right to be free of
discrimination primarily facilitates future acts of discrimination. The employer who has
purchased the right to discriminate is surely more likely to indulge discriminatory
preferences.”).
211. Harper, supra note 210, at 1296.
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212
disallowed in favor of more immediate victims. More broadly, the
deterrent effect of a nonwaivable law may protect even more diffuse
interests.213 Moreover, studies in the criminal context have shown that
misconduct breeds like misconduct: “[I]ndividuals’ decisions to
commit crimes are responsive to the decisions of other individuals
and not just to the price of crime.”214 Indeed, “studies reveal a strong
correlation between a person’s obedience and her perception of
215
others’ behavior and attitudes toward the law.” Put simply, failure
to deter one illegal act may facilitate other bad acts toward additional
victims. In any event, the reality of existing law is that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized the deterrent benefit of certain
laws,216 and it has indicated that arbitration clauses may not be used to
217
detract from this benefit.

212. II PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES & THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 339e, at 331 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that plaintiff may lack
antitrust standing when a “more immediate victim of the defendant’s violation is available as a
‘superior’ plaintiff to vindicate the public interest”). Among the reasons for this limitation, it is
recognized that “damages for all ‘remote’ plaintiffs are more than necessary to deter illegal
conduct and may overdeter.” Id. ¶ 335c3, at 290. I am grateful to Professor Max Schanzenbach
for this illustration.
213. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law & Equity, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 17, 19
(2002) (noting that standing doctrine “simplif[ies] the legal system by channeling the rights of
action through one party” on the theory that, “[s]o long as [that party] is allowed to sue, others
receive the indirect benefits of deterrence before the loss, even if they do not get any direct
compensation after the fact”). Professor Judith McMorrow contends that “[t]he mere fact that
Congress uses its . . . authority to regulate private interactions indicates some effect or
consequence of those private acts on the public . . . . The mere presence of federal . . . law
indicates . . . that there are interests—however slight—involved in the statute beyond the
private interactions of the parties regulated.” McMorrow, supra note 204, at 453–54.
214. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349,
355 (1997).
215. Id. at 354; see also Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1987) (“Dispute processing systems that are predicated upon
so-called ‘creative’ solutions send a false signal to the community that the outcomes dictated by
substantive law are unworthy of enforcement.”).
216. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (emphasizing that
Title VII’s chief aim is to deter discrimination).
217. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)
(noting, in the course of enforcing an arbitration agreement, that “so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute
will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function[s]”); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting this passage from Mitsubishi).
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B. Arbitral Discretion to Ignore the Law as a Prospective Waiver
Courts frequently grapple with questions as to what constitutes a
“waiver” of the right to sue. Courts have considered, for example,
whether arbitration agreements placing burdensome costs on
plaintiffs are void by virtue of the contract’s power to inhibit plaintiffs
218
from pursuing their legal rights. In another line of cases, courts have
evaluated whether choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses amount
to impermissible, prospective waivers of U.S. law.219 This Section
approaches waivers from a different perspective—as the product of
added uncertainty over whether and to what extent disputes will be
resolved under established rules of law. Studies conclude that
increased levels of inaccuracy in the outcome of legal disputes can
hamper the law’s deterrent effect. This Section applies those lessons
and concludes that predispute arbitration clauses permitting
arbitrators to ignore the law should be treated like prospective
waivers because of their effect on the law’s capacity to deter.
1. The Link between Adjudicatory Accuracy and Deterrence.
Studies show that a law’s capacity to deter misconduct can depend
heavily on the perceived certainty that violators will be punished.220 In
the criminal context, “[t]he most common view among scholars is that
punishment certainty has a greater marginal deterrent effect than

218. See generally Jennifer L. Peresie, Case Note, Reducing the Presumption of Arbitrability,
22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 455–60 (2004) (describing two competing court of appeals
approaches to question whether arbitration provisions are enforceable when they impose costs
on plaintiffs).
219. See generally Anthony Ragozino, Domesticating the United States’ Securities Laws: The
Ninth Circuit Joins the Majority in Enforcing Forum Selection and Choice of Law Clauses
Displacing U.S. Law in Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 31, 36–55, 64–75
(1998) (summarizing decisions considering enforceability of choice-of-law and forum selection
clauses in suits alleging violations of U.S. securities law).
220. See Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of
the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 481 n.27 (2003) (“The relative certainty of consequences, of
course, affects the overall deterrent effect of legal rules.”); Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty v. Severity
of Punishment, ECON. INQUIRY, Apr. 1, 1991, at 297, 308 (“The results [of Grogger’s study]
point to large deterrent effects emanating from increased certainty of punishment, and much
smaller, and generally insignificant effects, stemming from increased severity of sanction.”);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1321,
1322 (2003) (“Unsurprisingly, . . . analyses generally agree that criminal behavior is increasingly
effectively deterred as punishment becomes either more certain or more severe.”); see also
King, supra note 202, at 738–39 (suggesting that jury verdicts in personal injury cases have
become “so unpredictable” that the law’s deterrent effect is impaired).
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221
punishment severity.” Indeed, policymakers in both the civil and
criminal spheres have acted on the understood link between the
certainty of punishment and deterrence.222
Just as deterrence benefits from consistently holding violators
accountable, mistakes that punish lawful conduct detract from the
law’s deterrent power.223 Parties contemplating whether to violate the
law will weigh the likely sanction they will suffer if they do with the
extent to which they may be erroneously penalized if they do not.
Anything that increases the cost of compliance, including the chance
that an innocent party will be found liable, reduces the law’s deterrent
effect. As Professors Kaplow and Shavell summarize their findings,
“deterrence is . . . increased by a higher level of accuracy, because it
raises the expected sanction for individuals who commit harmful acts
(by reducing false negatives) and decreases the expected sanction for

221. Strandburg, supra note 220, at 1322; see Johannes Andenaes, PUNISHMENT &
DETERRENCE 54 (1974) (“At least since the time of Beccaria, it has been commonly accepted
that the certainty of detection and punishment is of greater consequence in deterring people
from committing crimes than is the severity of the penalty.”); Kahan, supra note 214, at 379 (“A
high-certainty/low-severity strategy . . . is more likely to generate a low crime-rate
equilibrium.”); see also id. at 380 (“[E]mpirical studies . . . conclude that certainty of conviction
plays a much bigger role in discouraging all manner of crime than does severity of
punishment.”). Indeed, Professor Kahan’s “social influence” model actually attributes even
more effect to certainty than the traditional economic model does. Id. at 379.
222. The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure making
sanctions mandatory rather than discretionary was intended to increase the rule’s power to
deter frivolous filings. See, e.g., Barbara Comninos Kruzansky, Note, Sanctions for Nonfrivolous
Complaints? Sussman v. Bank of Israel and Implications for the Improper Purpose Prong of
Rule 11, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1359, 1372 (1998) (“Through the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, federal
rulemakers sought to emphasize deterrence by making violators of the Rule subject to
mandatory sanctions.”); see also Bruce G. Vanyo & Ignacio E. Salceda, Making Motions to
Dismiss More Moving: The Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1996S PLI/CORP. 35, 45 (noting
that, even when the Rule 11 sanctions were mandatory, between 1983 and 1993, experience
showed that “the application of sanctions is all too often haphazard, leading to the lessening of
the deterrent effects of a sanctions provision”). The U.S. Sentencing Commission made the
related observation that “[c]omplexity can seriously compromise the certainty of punishment
and its deterrent effect.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL pt. A, § 1.2 (1987).
223. See I.P.L. Png, Note, Optimal Subsidies & Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error, 6
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 101, 101 (1986) (“[T]o the extent that an individual who has not violated
the law will be made to pay damages, the cost of violating the law, relative to not doing so, will
be reduced. The result will be more violations of the law.”); see also Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A.
Hall, What If You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235, 261 (2003) (observing that “[e]ven if a general deterrent effect could be
proved [for medical malpractice litigation], that effect would be lessened by the uncertainty of
sanction for harm resulting from the undesirable behavior and the possibility of sanction for
harm unrelated to bad acts”); Strandburg, supra note 220, at 1321 (advancing the thesis that
conviction of the innocent lessens criminal law’s deterrent effect).
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224
individuals who do not (by reducing false positives).” In short, the
greater the perceived likelihood that violators—and only violators—
will be sanctioned, the greater the law’s deterrent power. False
negatives and false positives both tend to undermine the law’s
capacity to deter wrongdoing.225

224. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 2–3 (1994); see also Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal
Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 223, 229 (2000) (noting a positive
correlation between adjudicatory accuracy and deterrence); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 99, 100
(1989) (“Assuming a suit will be brought, both types of error reduce an individual’s incentive to
obey the law.”). Judge Frank Easterbrook makes the same point in the criminal context:
“Deterrence increases with the difference between what happens to you if you violate the law
and what happens to those who don’t. Every conviction of an innocent person undermines
deterrence by reducing the marginal punishment of the guilty . . . .” Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea
Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1970 (1992).
225. “[B]oth types of error reduce deterrence . . . .” A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, J. ECON. LITERATURE, Mar. 2000, at 45,
60 (emphasis omitted). When the universe of possible behavior can be described by a
continuum—as is often true with negligence claims, for example—ill-defined legal standards
may promote overdeterrence. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain
Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 281–82 & n.8 (1986) (describing their model’s
overdeterrence implications in assuming that actors choose from a spectrum of possible conduct
rather than “from only two discrete options—to commit or not to commit the crime”); see also
John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 967 (1984) (explaining that the authors’ analysis is interested
chiefly in “parties who must choose some course of action from a more or less continuous range
of choices”). The idea is that uncertainty over the location of the legal limit on the continuum
will motivate parties to occupy points below it—so long as the likelihood of being found liable
for innocent conduct decreases as one gets farther from that limit. Even taking account of this
effect, however, Craswell and Calfee conclude that parties may “undercomply”—may be
insufficiently deterred from engaging in proscribed conduct—as the level of uncertainty rises to
more substantial levels. See Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards,
supra, at 280 (summarizing their finding that “[v]ery broad uncertainty . . . is more likely to lead
to undercompliance”).
If arbitrators were authorized to ignore the law in their discretion, see infra Part III.B.2,
the result would be tremendous uncertainty. Moreover, such discretion would likely foster a
situation far closer to the legal “error” scenario—in which inaccuracy undermines deterrence—
than to the “vague standard” scenario in which parties can predictably reduce the likelihood of
being found liable simply by adjusting their behavior along a defined continuum. Arbitrators
free to ignore the law in favor of their sense of justice would not be confined to such a
continuum, making it difficult for parties to avoid false liability by “overcomplying” with
established law. For example, the arbitrator might decide that a terminated employee should get
something as a matter of distributive justice, even if the employer is innocent of wrongdoing;
alternatively, the arbitrator might opt to relieve the employer of liability for a clear act of
employment discrimination because an adverse award would impose a substantial hardship on
the employer, or because the employer is a first-time offender.
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2. Arbitrators’ Discretion to Ignore Nonwaivable Law.
Arbitrators derive their powers solely from the parties’ contract. With
respect to nonwaivable rights, this contract either tells the arbitrator
whether to apply these norms or—tacitly or expressly—it gives the
arbitrator discretion over whether to do so. Plainly, a predispute
arbitration clause directing an arbitrator to ignore nonwaivable law in
226
any future arbitration would be a void, prospective waiver. This
Article contends, however, that the same would be true of a contract
allowing the arbitrator to decide whether to apply nonwaivable
rights.227

226. As one court put it in the context of all (not just nonwaivable) legal claims: “Parties to
a contract calling for statutory arbitration are not free to agree, implicitly or explicitly, that their
dispute will be resolved in disregard of controlling principles of constitutional, statutory, or
judge-made law, and expect the courts to approve and enforce the result.” Detroit Auto. InterIns. Exch. v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 429–30 (Mich. 1982). The court derived this conclusion
from a conception of the court’s own institutional integrity. See id. at 430 (“We cannot give
parties the use, and benefit, and authority of the state’s judicial process which exists solely to
interpret and apply the law by giving effect to an agreement to ignore the law.”).
Nonwaivable rights are subject neither to full and direct nor partial and indirect waiver.
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 21, at 113 (“Where it applies, this general public policy against
limitation-of-liability clauses operates to invalidate not only contract clauses purporting to
eliminate liability for future wrongs, but also clauses tending to limit liability, even partially or
indirectly . . . .”); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 n.19 (1985) (“[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in
tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust
violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy.”). In fact, parties can use choice-of-law clauses to select the law that will govern their
relationship—even if that means opting out of one jurisdiction’s “mandatory” law—provided
that certain criteria are satisfied. See Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP.
L. 245, 261–66 (1993) (outlining requirements for the enforcement of contractual choice-of-law
clauses). There is often an inherent legal uncertainty among parties to a contract from different
jurisdictions, however, meaning the deterrent effect of any arguably relevant “mandatory” law
is already compromised. Recall that the “considerable uncertainty” over governing law was the
impetus behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974). See supra text accompanying notes 62–65. At least with choice-of-law clauses, moreover,
the parties are limited to rules that some jurisdiction has adopted. Ribstein, supra, at 255
(“[U]se of choice-of-law clauses to avoid mandatory rules is constrained by the fact that
avoidance [of mandatory rules] requires applying a state law . . . .”). This is a critical limitation
obviously absent in cases when arbitrators are free to ignore the law in favor of an intuitive
sense of equity.
227. The rationale is not that arbitrators lack authority that the parties to a predispute
agreement themselves lack, see, e.g., Ware, supra note 48, at 737–38 n.148 (noting that
contracting parties “lack the power to contract out of a mandatory law prior to a dispute” and
therefore cannot delegate that power to an arbitrator); Nathalie Voser, Mandatory Rules of
Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 319, 332 (1996) (“The argument has been made that arbitrators must apply
mandatory rules because the parties cannot confer on the arbitral tribunal more freedom than
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Affording an arbiter of future conflicts the discretion to ignore
the law introduces substantial uncertainty into the dispute resolution
228
229
process. Of course, all adjudications carry some risk of error, and
assigning the case to an adjudicator relatively more prone to good
faith error increases the likelihood of a mistaken outcome. But this
increase is quantitative, it is one of degree. Parties face such a risk, for
example, when choice-of-law rules require courts in one state to apply
the laws of another. The forum state will be less familiar with the
foreign law and therefore, theoretically, more likely to commit legal
error.
Agreeing to assign future disputes to adjudicators free to ignore
the law entirely and who can instead apply their own norms is
qualitatively different. Such an agreement completely unhinges future
230
disputes from substantive legal rules. The arbitrator trying to apply
the law may make a mistake, but any error is more likely to involve
less well-entrenched or settled areas of the law—precisely the areas in
which courts themselves are more likely to reach conflicting
outcomes. In contrast, an adjudicator free to ignore the law entirely
may abandon legal rules even in the most obvious or egregious cases.
The “error” that would accompany such freedom is sure to detract
materially from the law’s deterrent effect. In that way, a predispute
agreement authorizing arbitrators to disregard the law in their
discretion is tantamount to a prospective waiver of legal rights.231
they have under the national legal systems involved.”), a rationale that would prohibit parties
from requiring arbitrators to ignore nonwaivable rights in resolving any future disputes. Parties
are presumably free to agree, predispute, to consult one another if a conflict arises and to
consider resolving their controversy in a way that a court bound by law would not. What parties
cannot do, this Article contends, is commit in advance to let a third party decide whether to
follow the law in resolving some future dispute.
228. See Lipton, supra note 195, at 6 (“[I]f arbitrators are not strictly bound by the law,
parties to arbitration will not receive the same degree of outcome predictability as they would in
judicial litigation.”).
229. See, e.g., Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, supra note 225,
at 284 (noting that, even if jurors are properly instructed, they may render an erroneous
verdict).
230. See generally Davis, supra note 104, at 83–84 (“Some argue that ignoring law diminishes
respect for legal norms. Parties enter into arbitration agreements, knowing that if they or their
employees act irresponsibly the arbitrators may not hold them to the standards of substantive
law.”); id. at 84 (“Critics of arbitration argue that to the extent that arbitrators do not apply
substantive law, they remove the incentive to abide by it.”); see also Mehra, supra note 205, at
315 (asserting that the fact that an international arbitrator “may apply completely different legal
rules than a U.S. court would” reduces “the expected value of an antitrust claim”).
231. An arbitrator contractually permitted to ignore the law undermines nonwaivable legal
principles in another way, too. The law is not merely a deterrent; it is a means of communicating
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Note that this conclusion follows solely from the potential for
unpredictable error; it does not assume that arbitral error is biased
toward one party or the other. Scholars have observed that an arbitral
system that “systemically reduces the legal liability of . . . defendants”
232
necessarily reduces the law’s deterrent effect. Some scholars now
suggest that plaintiffs may fare better on the whole in certain types of
233
arbitration than in litigation, however. Additional empirical study is
needed on this score, and the theory outlined in this Article does not
assume systemic bias in favor of defendants. Indeed, the law’s
deterrent effect could be equally compromised if arbitration began to
favor plaintiffs by mistakenly holding defendants liable for perfectly
legal conduct.234 It is the perceived, heightened likelihood of any kind
of error that undermines deterrence.

decisions society has made about proper conduct. The incentive to learn and internalize these
norms is not weakened because there is a chance that an adjudicator will inadvertently misapply
them: arguing before a relatively inexperienced judge still requires counsel to master the public
law and argue for its application in the client’s favor, and a client’s best bet is still to learn
established legal limits and live within them. Not so with adjudicators free to abandon settled
rules in favor of their own sense of justice. In such a case, the public law becomes significantly
less important, reduced to one of many tools that counsel can use in the client’s defense. See
Brunet, supra note 215, at 19 (“Once a citizen loses the predictability of a probable lawconstrained court outcome, the benefit of ‘law’ as signal is lost.”). Lawyers in that context no
longer need to speak the same language—i.e., the relevant statutory terms and interpretative
case law. They can urge the arbiter to ignore all of that in favor of an intuitive sense of fairness.
232. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 37. Citing data suggesting that employers fare better as
defendants in arbitration than in litigation, Professor Schwartz concludes that a predispute
arbitration clause acts as a prospective waiver of substantive rights. See id. at 113 (“If, as I have
argued, a regime of compelled arbitration reduces aggregate plaintiffs’ compensation and
defense costs of statutory violations, then it functions in much the same way as an indirect,
prospective waiver of substantive rights.”); see also Brunet, supra note 215, at 17–18 (“[I]f
society learns that [alternative dispute resolution] is a way to avoid the harsh consequences of
breach of contract, then the deterrence effect of damages for breach is weakened
considerably.”). Professor Schwartz is particularly concerned with predispute arbitration clauses
that appear in employment agreements and other contracts of adhesion. He proposes that such
clauses be unenforceable when they appear in adhesive contracts or that the Supreme Court
protect employees by overruling or severely limiting its decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), described supra in the text accompanying notes 87–92.
Schwartz, supra note 21, at 125–30.
233. See, e.g., Leader & Burger, supra note 121, at 88–89 (reviewing statistical data on
employer-employee arbitration); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and
Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 45–54 (1998) (same).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 223–24.
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C. Reading the Contract to Avoid an Unenforceable Waiver
In the vast run of cases, of course, the arbitration agreement is
235
silent regarding the arbitrator’s duty to apply substantive law.
Contract law is well equipped to grapple with this situation, however.
The law recognizes that contracting parties may fail to address a
contingency for any number of reasons, and courts are prepared to
imply a term, at times to advance the interests of “society in
general.”236
Likewise, courts faced with contractual vagueness or ambiguity
presume that the contracting parties meant to execute a legally
enforceable agreement. This canon of interpretation aims to give
effect to the parties’ actual intentions.237 Applied to an arbitration
contract, this presumption favors an interpretation that does not
create an invalid waiver by leaving arbitrators free to ignore the law
surrounding nonwaivable rights.
Courts also rely on a canon of contract construction—a rule that
imports meaning regardless of the parties’ actual, underlying
intentions—favoring agreements that are enforceable and in the
public interest. “The rule that courts favor a construction in the public

235. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
236. FARNSWORTH, supra note 202, § 7.15, at 494–97, § 7.16, at 501.
237. See 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.22, at 235–38 (Joseph
M. Perillo ed., 1998):
Many cases can be seen in which, when the words of the contract can be interpreted
either in a way which would cause the contract to be valid or in a way which would
result in invalidity, courts have chosen the former interpretation. This preference is
based upon the judicial belief that the parties intend their agreement to be valid
rather than invalid, lawful rather than unlawful, and honest and effective rather than
fraudulent and voidable.
Corbin comments on this issue elsewhere as well. See id. at 232 (“Courts often state that when a
contract term can be interpreted in at least two ways, and when one of those interpretations
would result in a valid contract and the other would cause the agreement to be void or illegal,
the former interpretation is preferred.”); id. at 234 (“If . . . the words of a contract have more
than one possible meaning, and one of these meanings would produce a legal effect that the
court believes the parties intended to produce, while another meaning would not, the court
should unhesitatingly adopt the first meaning.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 203 (1981) (“[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective
meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable,
unlawful, or of no effect.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 202, § 5.1, at 325 (“Given a choice
between two reasonable interpretations of an agreement, a court will prefer the one under
which the agreement involves no contravention of public policy and is enforceable to the one
under which it involves such a contravention and is not enforceable.”); id. (noting that this
interpretive principle “is epitomized in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (‘that the
thing may rather have effect than perish’)”).
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interest is not a rule of interpretation because it is not designed to
discern the parties’ intended meaning. It is instead a rule of
construction because it determines the legal effect of their
238
contract.” Here again, the preferred construction would be one that
does not encumber a right’s deterrent value by giving an arbitrator
discretion to ignore governing law in resolving future disputes.
The upshot of all of this is that longstanding contract conventions
should read a predispute agreement to require the arbitrator to apply
nonwaivable law in good faith, unless the contract expressly directs
the arbitrator to act contrary to law or expressly grants the arbitrator
discretion to ignore nonwaivable rights (in which cases this clause
would be unenforceable).239 By operation of law, the contract imposes
a duty on arbitrators to identify and apply governing law in good
faith. By way of analogy and illustration, this is the same fundamental
duty that the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes on state courts
applying the laws of other states. As Justice Stevens described it, the
“Clause requires only that States . . . acknowledge the validity and
finality of such laws and attempt in good faith to apply them when
necessary as they would be applied by home state courts.”240 Likewise,
Justice Holmes commented that the court’s duty is to “candidly
constru[e]” another state’s law “to the best of its ability,” even if the
court ultimately does so in a way that the home state would reject.241 It
is this minimal duty that the law should read otherwise silent
arbitration contracts to include, whenever nonwaivable rights are at
issue, to render the contract legal and enforceable.

238. CORBIN, supra note 237, § 24.25, at 266; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 207 (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or
a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.”).
239. In this sense, parties could not avoid the effect of this arbitral duty by express contract
language. Cf. 2 ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 356 (2004)
(noting that parties cannot contract away duty of good faith performance implied between
contracting parties).
240. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 834–35 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). For an articulation of this duty that bears particular resemblance to
the “manifest disregard” doctrine, see Sun Oil Corp. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1988)
(“To constitute a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause . . . .
our cases make plain that [a state court’s] misconstruction [of another state’s law] must
contradict law of the other [s]tate that is clearly established and that has been brought to the
court’s attention.”).
241. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917),
quoted in Shutts, 472 U.S. at 835.
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D. A Basis for Limited Judicial Review under the FAA
Having identified a contractual duty on the part of arbitrators
resolving disputes governed by nonwaivable law, a basis for limited
judicial review emerges. Unlike “manifest disregard,” which is
frequently depicted as an extrastatutory, judge-made addition to the
FAA, this basis has its footing in § 10(a) itself. And although it is in
many ways similar to the besieged “manifest disregard” doctrine, this
FAA-based review benefits from an identifiable contractual and
statutory grounding.242
1. Exceeding Arbitral Power Under § 10(a)(4). Recall that
§ 10(a)(4) allows courts to overturn arbitral awards in cases “where
243
the arbitrators exceed[] their powers.” Understanding that under
traditional contract rules arbitration clauses require arbitrators to
interpret and apply nonwaivable rules in good faith, § 10(a)(4)
authorizes courts to overturn awards when arbitrators “exceed” their
power by abandoning this duty.
Some have warned against the use of § 10(a)(4) as a basis for
reviewing the merits of arbitral awards.244 “[T]he powers of . . .
245
arbitrator[s] are contractual in nature,” the argument runs, and
arbitrators exceed their authority only by doing more than the
contract permits.246 “It is the submission of issues to the arbitrator,
and the definition of the arbitrator’s authority as set forth in the
arbitration agreement, that define section 10(a)(4)’s ‘exceeded
powers’ inquiry.”247 As one commentator explained:

242. Historically, courts resisted finding that the parties required arbitrators to apply the law
correctly, absent clear language to this effect. STURGES, supra note 180, § 366, at 794–96.
243. 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4) (2000); see supra text accompanying note 29. This provision has an
analogue in state arbitration statutes. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23(a)(4) (2000); UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 12(a)(3) (1955).
244. See, e.g., Mungioli, supra note 97, at 1091 (citing cases supporting the proposition that
because an arbitrator’s power derives from the parties’ contract, “the test for vacatur under the
first clause of section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, whether the ‘arbitrator exceeded the powers
delegated to him by the parties,’ does not necessarily give courts the authority to scrutinize the
merits of an arbitration award”).
245. Id. at 1090.
246. See Hayford, supra note 97, at 455 (“The case law demonstrates a judicial belief that
the arbitrator’s ‘powers’ referred to in the first clause of section 10(a)(4) are contractual in
nature.”).
247. Id. at 455–56. One scholar explains that
where the parties, without stipulating applicable law, agree to submit a dispute to
arbitration, the arbitrators are not constrained by any particular legal norms. The
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Courts have held, as a general rule, that ‘arbitrators need not follow
otherwise applicable law when deciding issues before them unless
they are commanded to do so by the terms of the arbitration
agreement.’ This rule derives from the fundamental principle of
arbitration: the agreement shapes the process. If the agreement
requires the arbitrators to apply particular law, they must. If the
agreement does not stipulate any law, the natural inference is that
the parties’ silence frees the arbitrators to enforce their own sense of
248
justice.

As another scholar described the practical effect of contractual
silence, “[I]n the absence of restrictions agreed to by the parties,
arbitrators have the power to interpret the contract they are
enforcing, to interpret the law, and, to a very considerable degree, to
249
disregard or err respecting the law.”
Likewise, only very few courts and commentators have tried to
ground anything akin to the “manifest disregard” standard in the
250
FAA (as opposed to treating it as a purely judge-made doctrine). A
handful of courts have cited § 10(a)(4) in conjunction with the

arbitrators may draw on state law, federal law, or natural law. If so inclined, they may
borrow from French civil law. Or, they may simply enforce their own sense of justice.
Davis, supra note 104, at 124. “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim,” however, Davis
argues that “the parties direct the arbitrators to apply the statute in question.” Id. at 125. “At
the beginning of an arbitration, the parties, given the choice, would surely desire judicial
correction rather than enforcement of awards violating the rule of decision that they instructed
the arbitrator to apply.” Id. at 126. This position is consistent with the argument outlined herein
to the extent that the two parties to a dispute mutually provide that an arbitration must proceed
pursuant to particular law, as through an express statement to that effect in the predispute
arbitration clause. If the predispute clause is silent as to governing law, however, it is less clear
that a defendant patently liable under established law, for example, would want the arbitrators
to apply that law faithfully to the exclusion of a defense argument grounded in notions of equity
or fairness.
248. Davis, supra note 104, at 59 (emphasis added) (quoting Univ. of Alaska v. Modern
Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Alaska 1974)); see also id. at 76 (“Unless the agreement
directs arbitrators to apply particular law, the arbitrators may resolve the dispute as they deem
appropriate, regardless of prevailing legal norms.”).
249. MACNEIL, supra note 113, § 40.5.2.4, at 48.
250. But see id., § 40.5.1.3, at 37–40 (arguing that “manifest disregard” is best understood as
an excess of arbitral authority, on the theory that courts can “defin[e] just what are the powers
of the arbitrators”); Rau, supra note 124, at 532 (“[T]he lion’s share of the ‘manifest disregard’
cases can be redistributed and placed within an alternative analytical construct—a simple
inquiry into the contractual powers of the arbitrator required by §10(a)(4).”); Rebecca Hanner
White, Arbitration and the Administrative State, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1283, 1300 (2003)
(“It appears as though ‘manifest disregard’ is merely the Court’s understanding of what Section
10(a)(4) of the FAA means rather than a judicially crafted exception to arbitral finality.”).
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251
“manifest disregard” doctrine, without explanation, and one court
read it into § 10(a)(1)’s provision for “undue means” and § 10(a)(2)’s
remedies for “evident partiality.”252 These courts invoke the statutory
restrictions, however, without ever attempting to explain why
arbitrators are powerless to decide cases based on their own
normative sense. As one commentator observed, it is purely “because
of their interpretation of the [Wilko] dictum that [these courts] are
attempting to read into the FAA.”253
If an agreement expressly requires an arbitrator to make a good
faith effort to follow the law, it would follow that § 10 affords a
remedy if and when the arbitrator chooses to disregard it. Indeed, this
254
is one way to read the Second Circuit’s decision in Wilko. The court
recognized that arbitrators might “not ordinarily consider themselves
bound to decide strictly according to legal rules,” but the court
concluded that arbitrators in that case would be “bound to decide in
accordance with the provisions of section 12(2)” because the margin
agreement was expressly “subject to” the securities laws.255 “Failure to
[decide in accordance with these laws] would, in [the court’s] opinion,
constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of
the Federal Arbitration Act . . . .”256
This Article contends, however, that predispute arbitration
clauses do contain such a limitation on arbitral authority even when—
as is usually the case—the agreement is silent. The FAA review that
some would agree is available when parties expressly require the

251. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.
1991); Saguenay Terminals, Ltd. v. San Martin Compania de Navegacion, S.A., 293 F.2d 796,
801 (9th Cir. 1961).
252. Metal Prods. Workers Union v. Torrington Co., 242 F. Supp. 813, 824 (D. Conn. 1965),
aff’d 358 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966).
253. Milam, supra note 104, at 711–12. Professor Hayford argues that the doctrine is best
read into the prohibition on arbitrator misconduct in § 10(a)(3). Hayford, supra note 104, at 137:
If ‘manifest disregard’ is understood only to occur, as the author has suggested, when
an arbitrator has correctly interpreted the law and then consciously or intentionally
ignored it, then ‘manifest disregard’ describes a kind of untoward arbitral behavior
which fits neatly within the proscription on arbitrator ‘misconduct’ and ‘misbehavior’
contained in Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA.
In Professor Hayford’s view, “the ‘manifest disregard’ of the law ground for vacatur most likely
will be addressed in one of two ways—either by the Supreme Court rejecting it as inconsistent
with Section 10(a) of the FAA, or by the Court bringing it within the embrace of Section
10(a)(3) of the Act.” Id. at 139.
254. 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
255. Id. at 444–45.
256. Id. at 445.
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arbitrator to apply the law is available in all cases, this Article
257
maintains, involving nonwaivable legal rights.
2. Characteristics of the “Good Faith” Standard and Its Practical
Effects. The standard of review advocated in this Article thus
proceeds from the understanding that arbitrators have a contractual
duty to apply the law as courts would: in good faith and to the best of
their ability. Courts authorized by § 10(a)(4) to investigate alleged
breaches of that duty need not review the arbitrators’ legal
decisionmaking de novo. Good faith legal error is possible in any
system of adjudication. It is the substantial increase in unpredictable,
nonlegal awards that comes from adjudication without a duty to apply
the law faithfully—and its profound, negative effect on the law’s
deterrent effect—that offends the bar on prospective waivers. The
standard outlined herein would empower courts to intervene under
§ 10(a)(4) only when arbitrators abandoned that good faith duty.
Nor would the § 10(a)(4) judicial inquiry depend on a written
award, a rarity in commercial arbitration. For example, if the written
filings or the transcript (available as a matter of course in some
arbitrations258) show a party inviting arbitrators to ignore established
legal norms, judgment for that party without an explanation would be
powerful evidence that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by
257. Analogously, some scholars have argued that if the parties contract to require the
arbitrators to decide legal questions correctly, legally erroneous awards can be overturned for
an arbitrator’s excess of authority under § 10(a)(4). See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal,
Contracting Around the RUAA: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 419, 431–33 (2003); Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D.
Henderson, Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Review and a
Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141,
193 (2002) (“If the arbitration agreement or arbitration code of procedure requires the
arbitrator to follow the law, arbitrators must comply with its requirement or otherwise exceed
their power and authority.”); Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 239 (1997) (“A contract that withdraws errors of law from the authority
conferred on the arbitrator—that, in other words, places issues of law ‘beyond the scope of the
submission’ to binding arbitration—should, then, allow an aggrieved party on ‘review’ to invoke
§10(a)(4).”). Professor Christopher Drahozal found that among thirty-four franchise
agreements requiring arbitration of future claims, two “effectively provided for judicial review
of errors of law by making legal errors beyond the scope of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.”
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 731.
258. See, for example, NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 10326(a) (2000):
A verbatim record by stenographic reporter or a tape recording of all arbitration
hearings shall be kept. If a party or parties to a dispute elect to have the record
transcribed, the cost of such transcription shall be borne by the party or parties
making the request unless the arbitrators direct otherwise. The arbitrators may also
direct that the record be transcribed.
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259
failing to apply the law in good faith. It makes sense in these
circumstances to place the burden on the arbitrators to show that they
did not accept the winning party’s invitation to ignore settled norms.
Moreover, doing so will discourage parties from inciting arbitrators to
ignore the law and will force arbitrators to take seriously objections
that a party is encouraging arbitrators to overstep their authority.
Likewise, in some cases an apparent compromise decision by
arbitrators to “split the difference” between the parties might support
an inference that arbitrators ignored their duty to apply the law as a
court would.260 Arbitrators who believe that the law as properly
applied affords some less-than-full relief would have an incentive to
reduce their reasoning to writing to rebut any such inference. Here
again, the “good faith” standard would actually encourage a written
award—the converse of the incentive fostered by current application
of the “manifest disregard” standard.261
Also, unlike the “manifest disregard” doctrine, the “good faith”
standard would not apply only when the arbitrator plainly “knew” the
governing rule but chose to ignore it. Rather, any evidence suggesting
that the arbitrator did not feel bound to decide the decision under
controlling law would be evidence of a dereliction of duty. Declining
to hear an argument because the arbitrator did not “want to get into
the law on that,” for example, would be evidence of arbitral
overreaching, as would an award based solely on an arbitrator’s “gut”

259. The Eleventh Circuit followed essentially this approach to the evidence in Montes v.
Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (1997), wherein the court overturned an arbitral award
for “manifest disregard of the law.” Id. at 1462. Montes sued her employer for allegedly
violating the FLSA. Id. at 1458. The suit went to arbitration pursuant to a predispute
agreement, and the arbitrator ruled for the employer, but only after the employer’s attorney
urged the arbitrators to ignore relevant law and decide the case in the defendant’s favor as a
matter of “equity.” Id. at 1459. Citing Wilko, the court recognized “manifest disregard” as a
nonstatutory ground for vacating an arbitral award. Id. at 1459–62 & n.5. Because “[t]here [was]
nothing in the award or elsewhere in the record to indicate that [the arbitrators] did not heed
this plea” to ignore the law, and given “the marginal evidence presented” by the defense, the
court decided that it could not conclude that the arbitrators had decided the case according to
law. Id. at 1467.
260. Another inference is also possible in some such cases. In her seminal 1961 article,
Professor Soia Mentschikoff reported the results of her survey of commercial arbitrators and
awards, including her finding that when arbitrators did render “partial awards,” many of them
“[were] arrived at in a judicial manner since they result[ed] from the striking of particular items
of damage that the arbitrators believe[d] [were] not justified under the facts or law of the
particular case.” Mentschikoff, supra note 157, at 861.
261. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 104, at 140 (“[T]he ‘manifest disregard’ of the law
standard has prevented the emergence of on the record decision making (i.e., reasoned awards)
in commercial arbitration.”).
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sense of fairness—even if the governing legal standard were
262
uncertain.
In the end, this Article not only calls on courts to abandon the
“manifest disregard” doctrine as a nonstatutory vehicle for judicial
review, but also provides a vehicle for limited judicial review in those
jurisdictions that currently refuse to recognize any duty on arbitrators
263
to apply substantive law. Both the original and revised Uniform
Arbitration Acts permit courts to vacate arbitral awards when
264
arbitrators exceed their authority under contract, something they do
whenever they fail to make a good faith effort to apply nonwaivable
law. Indeed, if the law at issue is one that cannot be waived
prospectively, courts wishing to reject any and all grounds for
substantive review must recognize that, in doing so, they are
necessarily presuming that the arbitration contract left it to the
arbitrator to decide whether to follow or to disregard that law. But
that presumes an arbitration clause that is a void, predispute waiver
of nonwaivable rights. Better to read the contract so that it is valid
and enforceable and to overturn an award that exceeds the
arbitrator’s contractual authority than to read the arbitration clause
as unenforceable ab initio.
CONCLUSION
Among the most controversial questions in the law of
commercial arbitration is what authority, if any, courts have to review
the substance of arbitral awards. Not surprisingly, courts and
commentators have grown particularly concerned that certain “public
law” rights will not be handled properly in private arbitration, to the
detriment of the arbitrating parties and the public at large.
This Article advances a new perspective on predispute
arbitration clauses, focusing on the limits these clauses themselves
impose on arbitrators’ authority. The Article contends that parties

262. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1233 (1993) (recommending that when addressing unsettled legal
questions, “employment arbitrators should continue to place predominant value on judicial
caution”); cf. Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940) (observing a duty on the
part of a federal court sitting in diversity “to ascertain and apply” state law even when a state
high court has not yet decided the issue).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 134–49 (describing both the Seventh Circuit’s
elimination of even “manifest disregard” review and decisions in California and other states).
264. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
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cannot enter into binding predispute agreements giving arbitrators
the discretion to decide whether to apply the law surrounding
statutory and other “nonwaivable” rights. The tremendous
unpredictability brought about by such a contract would undermine
the deterrent effect of the underlying, substantive rights, making the
conferral of arbitral discretion tantamount to an outright—and void—
waiver of the ability to vindicate those rights.
From this premise follows an FAA-based rule of judicial review
of arbitral awards. In the many cases where nonwaivable rights are at
stake, arbitrators exceed their authority under contract (in
contravention of the FAA) if they do not make a good faith effort to
identify and apply the law in the same manner that a court would.
This rule lends legitimacy, legal grounding, and definitional
consistency to a degree of judicial review, and it provides some
additional safeguards for many of the claims resolved in private
arbitration.

